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Overview 
This paper, prepared by the Economist Intelligence Unit for the US-China Economic 
and Security Council, summarises the context, current discussions and implications of 
a potential US-China bilateral investment treaty (BIT). The paper is organised in six 
sections: 
I. Existing US BITs 
II. China’s current BITs with other countries 
III. The potential US-China BIT 
IV. Major regulatory and transparency issues  
V. Implications for the US economy 
VI. Interviews 
Simply defined, a BIT is a treaty between two countries designed to promote and 
protect investments between the two signatory states. A BIT provides investors with a 
safer and more transparent investment environment by guarding against the risk of 
expropriation by the host state. Many countries, especially the larger economies, sign 
BITs with their main trading partners, both to ensure that companies from their 
country receive proper protection when they make investments abroad and to ensure 
that their rights can be protected and enforced through binding international 
arbitration. 
There are over 2,500 BITs in operation worldwide today, following on from the first 
BIT signed between Germany and Pakistan in 1959. Germany has more BITs than any 
other country (around 140), followed by China, with more than 120; the US has signed 
over 40 BITs. 
Most major economies have their own BIT model. The core elements of the US BIT, 
according to a recent interview with the US-China Business Council, require the 
partner-country government to provide US investors with: 
• the right to fair and equitable treatment, including neutral arbitration; 
• the right to full protection and security, including that provided by international 
law; 
• a non-discriminatory environment compared with domestic investors, based on 
the principles of national treatment and most-favoured-nation clauses; 
• the ability to move capital in and out of the country freely; 
• the right to full compensation in the event of expropriation or nationalisation; 
• the removal of performance requirements. 
China is now established as the leading recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
the developing world. It had FDI receipts of just under US$150bn in 2008 
(representing 390% growth on the 2000 figure). A key factor in this growth has been 
the increase in the overall number and sophistication of China’s BITs. China’s latest 
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investment treaties conform to international best practice, giving foreign investors a 
high level of protection from interference by government. 
China has signed BITs with most of the world’s most significant trading and investing 
countries, including Japan, Germany and the UK. A major omission is a US-China 
BIT; discussions were terminated following the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 
1989. Rising trade and investment flows between the two nations led them to resume 
negotiations in June 2008, following the fourth Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) 
meeting. The talks have continued under the Obama administration with a new title, 
the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED); these will be discussed in Section III. 
 
I. Existing US bilateral investment treaties 
Introduction 
The US BIT programme, initiated by Ronald Reagan in 1981, is intended to encourage 
and protect US investments abroad, promote the adoption of market-directed policies 
in other countries and support the development of standards of international law. 
As at September 2009, the US was party to 40 active BITs with developing countries 
in all regions of the world. Several other treaties have been signed by the US but not 
by the partner country; still others are in the process of negotiation, potentially leading 
to a formal agreement. Though the first US BIT went into force more than 20 years 
ago, the US is party to far fewer agreements than other major economies. China, 
France, Germany, Italy, South Korea and the UK, for example, have signed more than 
twice the number of BITs as has the US. 
The US has BITs with the following countries: Albania, Argentina, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Republic of Congo, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, 
Georgia, Grenada, Honduras, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Panama, Poland, Romania, 
Senegal, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine and 
Uruguay.1 More information concerning the date these BITs came into force is in 
Appendix 1.  
US BITs, once ratified by both parties, remain in force for ten years. Following the 
initial ten-year period, either party may terminate a BIT with one year’s notice. For ten 
years following the date of termination, however, the articles contained in the BIT will 
continue to apply to covered investments made during the time the agreement was 
active.2  
                                                          
1 List of BITs now in force  see  http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements /Bilateral_Investment_Treaties/index.asp 
 
2More detail on the 2004 model US BIT discussion can be found at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf . 
US BIT programme dates
from 1981
BIT negotiations resumed in
2008
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All US BITs are based on a model BIT that was last revised in 2004. The model is in 
the process of another revision, however, by the US Department of State and the 
Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR), which jointly lead the US BIT 
programme. A public forum on the matter was held in late July 2009. The major 
concerns voiced at that time included the following: 
• The 2004 model BIT provides weaker protection for US commercial interests 
compared with the 1994 model 
• The current investor-state dispute-resolution process is inadequate. 
• The distinction between government regulatory action and indirect expropriation 
is unclear and, as such, potentially harmful to US commercial interests. 
• There is a need to develop enforceable rules within BITs, beyond national 
regulations, in terms of labour and the environment. 
• Restrictions on capital controls in the current model BIT are potentially outdated.3  
It is unclear whether the prospective US-China BIT agreement would be based on the 
2004 model or on a new one, since the Obama administration is now conducting a 
review of the BIT programme. This inter-agency review of the US model is focused on 
its role as a template for negotiations, and is being conducted concurrent with the BIT 
negotiations with China, India and other countries. An official at the US-China 
Business Council in Washington noted in a September 2009 interview that the present 
goal is to fashion a high-standard BIT, similar to those the US has negotiated with 
other developing countries. US business groups view this type of BIT as providing the 
best level of market access, legal recourse, competitive practices and equitable 
treatment, given China’s large state-owned sector. 
In September 2009, at the request of the Department of State and the USTR, the State 
Department’s Advisory Committee on International Economic Affairs (ACIEP) 
established a subcommittee to analyse the US model BIT. The ACIEP subcommittee’s 
work centred on three areas in particular: dispute-settlement provisions, state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and financial-services issues. 
On the matter of dispute settlement, which was the topic of particularly “robust” 
discussion, subcommittee members were split in several directions. Some members 
strongly support the investor-state dispute-settlement provisions contained in the 2004 
model BIT, arguing that such provisions are contained in almost all of the 2,600 BITs 
currently in effect and as such provide an “objective, fair and non-politicised forum” for 
investors seeking redress for breaches of the BIT, and that not using investor-state 
dispute-settlement mechanisms would put the US at a competitive disadvantage. Other 
members firmly believe that the international dispute mechanism in the model BIT 
presents significant risks because international arbitrators working on cases brought 
under the mechanism may not have a full understanding of local laws and societal 
values. In addition, some subcommittee members support exhaustion of domestic legal 
systems before investors have the option to pursue international arbitration, whereas 
others believe that would be contrary to present international legal practice. 
                                                          
3 Source: Minutes, July 29th 2009 US Dept of State and USTR meeting. 
The 2004 model BIT is the
starting point for revisions
The current review of the US
model BIT 
The release of the
September 2009 ACIEP
report 
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Regarding SOEs, the subcommittee recommended that the US administration assess 
whether the model BIT requires countries to ensure that their SOEs accord national 
treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment to covered investments. 
On financial-services issues, where the analysis focused on whether exceptions to the 
free transfer of capital for covered investments should be made during balance-of-
payments crises, the subcommittee was unable to reach consensus. The subcommittee 
did conclude, however, that a claimant should be permitted to submit claims involving 
breach of national treatment and most-favoured-nation obligations vis-à-vis financial 
services4.  
Among the many topics covered in a meeting between President Obama and President 
Hu of China during Mr Obama’s mid-November 2009 visit to China—the nascent 
global economic recovery, climate change, energy issues, nuclear non-proliferation—
were issues related to trade and investment. A joint US-China statement issued 
following the meeting indicated that “the two sides agreed to work proactively to 
resolve bilateral trade and investment disputes in a constructive, co-operative and 
mutually beneficial manner. Both sides will expedite negotiation on a bilateral 
investment treaty.” 
Despite the joint US-China statement issued during President Obama’s November 2009 
trip that BIT negotiations will be expedited, it does not appear that a US-China BIT will 
be finalised in the near future. Negotiations are proceeding on a technical, but not yet a 
political, level. On the matter of politics, some observers note historical difficulties in 
reaching agreement on foreign investment and trade agreements during an economic 
downturn. The fact that many members of Congress have voiced concerns about 
expanding trade and investment linkages with China is also likely to be a hindrance to 
the US-China BIT winning two-thirds majority support in the Senate.  
Should the model-BIT review extend far into 2010, it will delay negotiations with 
China, since the US needs to have a model treaty solidly in place before moving to 
finalise specifics of a US-China treaty. During the ACIEP discussions, several business 
representatives proposed that the committee endorse the 2004 model BIT to expedite 
finalisation of BIT negotiations with China and other countries—a move that was 
rejected by representatives of labour unions. 
In addition to not having a BIT with China, the United States also does not have active 
agreements with the other three BRICs (Brazil, Russia or India), the group 
constituting the world’s four largest emerging economies. A BIT with Russia, signed 
by the US in 1992, has not been ratified by Russia and thus has never gone into force. 
Discussions on a BIT with India have been underway since 2008, although a formal 
agreement does not seem likely in the near future. And although formal negotiations 
towards a BIT with Brazil have not yet begun, the topic was recently addressed at a 
high-level forum of Brazilian CEOs in Washington, DC. (Brazil is not party to any 
BITs; its reluctance to accede to such agreements may centre on whether Brazilian law 
would allow them.) 
                                                          
4  A number of other topics were covered in the ACIEP report. The report is available  at: 
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rts/othr/2009/131098.html 
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A BIT with China, the world’s third-largest economy in nominal GDP terms (at more 
than US$3.8bn in 2008), would represent by far the largest economy with which the 
US has a BIT. Turkey, the world’s 17th-largest economy (at nearly US$800m), is now 
the biggest economy with which the US has an active investment treaty. A US-China 
BIT would be only the second international investment agreement the US has signed 
with a major capital exporter. 
 
Major themes and issues in US BITs5 
Under the model US BIT, each party is required to provide investors and covered 
investments (that is, investments of a company or national of one party of a US BIT in 
the territory of the other party) “treatment no less favourable than it accords, in like 
circumstances, to its own investors with respect to establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of 
investments in its territory.” This constitutes the principle of national treatment. 
Though market-entry provisions are generally included in any BIT, the US BIT model 
is unique in that it provides so many levels of post-establishment protection to 
investors. 
Additionally, the US model BIT contains an article on most-favoured-nation (MFN) 
treatment that provides the same protections for BIT-partner countries as it does, in 
like circumstances, for countries with which it does not have a BIT. In general, US 
BITs require the use of the more favourable of national or MFN treatment for 
investments of the other party. 
In the US-Turkey BIT, which entered into force in 1990, Turkey insisted that MFN 
treatment be used for the establishment of investments. In practice, this means that all 
subsequent stages in the life cycle of an investment (acquisition, expansion, etc.) are 
undertaken using the more favourable of national or MFN treatment. The same 
qualification was used in the US-Morocco BIT.  
The model BIT also provides clear protection against expropriation or nationalisation 
of an investment (by either party) except for public purpose, which must be 
undertaken in a non-discriminatory manner and with “prompt, adequate, and effective 
compensation.” For expropriation, the model BIT specifies that compensation must be 
made at the fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the 
date of expropriation and that compensation must include interest. The annexes to 
individual BITs spell out further terms regarding a potential expropriation. 
In the US-Turkey BIT, the language on expropriation was revised to say that interest 
on an expropriated investment be repaid at the “government borrowing rate” rather 
than at a “commercially reasonable rate”. 
US BITs as well as investment chapters of US free-trade agreements (FTAs), such as 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11, provide certain standards for foreign-investment protection. 
Article 2.1 of the model BIT stipulates that national or federal governments can be 
                                                          
5 Information in this section is based on the text of the 2004 model US BIT  found at:  http://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/117601.pdf  and individual US BITs found online at:  http://tcc.export.gov/ 
Trade_Agreements/Bilateral_Investment_Treaties/index.asp 
Reciprocal market access
State, local and county-level 
rules
Expropriation and
nationalisation
clauses
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liable for breaches of these standards even when these arise from actions taken by 
state, provincial and county-level governments. 
There may indeed be circumstances in which a foreign investor could sue the US 
government for monetary damages under a BIT based on a local government’s 
restrictions that prevent the investor from obtaining the intended benefits of its 
investment. Under many US BITs, this is done by submitting a claim to an 
independent, international arbitration tribunal indicating that the local government’s 
actions breached one or more standards of foreign-investment protection in the BIT. 
[More discussion of this issue can be found in the section on arbitration processes on 
p. 10.] The claim would be for monetary damages for harm to the investor or the 
investment. The case would be made that there was an issue or breach of the 
following: 
• National Treatment: If local regulations were uniquely applied to foreign 
investors, there could be a BIT violation; 
• MFN treatment: If local regulations applied to foreign investors from one country 
and not from another, there could be a BIT violation; 
• Minimum Standard of Treatment: Tribunals have reached different conclusions 
about what constitutes the minimum standard of treatment; a BIT violation could 
occur if government regulations were imposed in a way that abused due legal process 
or denied justice to the foreign investor (such as for sham administrative or legal 
proceedings);  
• Expropriation: The investor might have a valid BIT claim if government 
regulations constituted an expropriation of the foreign investor’s property, and the 
expropriation (a) was not done for a public purpose; (b) was done in a discriminatory 
manner (for example, simply because the investor was foreign); (c) did not result in 
adequate and effective compensation paid in a timely manner; or (d) was without due 
process of law. 
Within the confines of the 2004 US model BIT, article 7 obliges both the US and the 
partner country to permit the transfer of capital related to a covered investment (profits, 
dividends, capital gains, proceeds from the sale of an investment and several other 
categories) “freely and without delay”, and in to and out of its territory at the market 
exchange rate. Recently, however, there has been much discussion of whether the US 
should revise this article to allow for exceptions to free movement of capital during 
balance-of-payments crises. Large current-account and capital-account imbalances 
between the United States and China and the possibility that these imbalances may 
contribute to future balance-of-payments instability point to the likelihood of serious 
consideration about such exceptions during US-China BIT negotiations. 
Some language on capital transfers has been adjusted. Because of Turkey’s concerns 
about the volatility of its exchange rate, for example, the US-Turkey BIT states that 
“in exceptional financial or economic circumstances related to foreign exchange”, 
Turkey may delay the transfer of proceeds from the sale or liquidation of an 
investment until foreign-exchange reserves have risen to a more acceptable level, and 
that the delay may extend up to three years. 
Capital transfers
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Active US BITs do not address which sectors are more or less important than others in 
terms of investment. Instead, they employ a “negative list” approach, specifying which 
sectors are off limits for partner countries. If the US does not list a sector, the other 
BIT party presumably has the right to invest in it at will. 
In the US-Panama BIT, for example, the US includes on its negative list, among other 
sectors, air transport, shipping, banking, insurance, broadcasting, telephone services 
and satellite communications. Panama, likewise, limits investment in many of the 
same sectors. 
In the US-Uruguay BIT, the first signed following the 2004 revision of the model text, 
the US placed limitations on investments in the air transport, banking, insurance, 
mining, radio/satellite communications and cable-television sectors, among others. 
Uruguay puts limitations on investments in sectors such as air, rail, road, and port 
infrastructure and services; financial services; water and gas; fisheries; and radio and 
television. 
Outside the realm of BIT stipulations, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States (CFIUS) reviews foreign investments in the US. In recent years, review 
and rejection by the CFIUS of a number of major proposed investments has caused 
tension with several countries, including China.  
Whether a US-China BIT takes a “negative list”, a “positive list” or some other approach 
towards sectors open to mutual investment, the general sentiment among observers of 
the US-China BIT negotiations is that the US will insist that a BIT not limit national-
security (that is, CFIUS) reviews of proposed investments currently in place. That said, 
pending foreign investments in the US are submitted for review CFIUS on a voluntary 
basis. However, CFIUS does have the power to review pending investments that are not 
submitted. 
By some accounts, a US-China BIT could be an opportunity to strengthen the principle 
of non-discrimination of Chinese investment in the US compared with other countries’ 
investment in the US. 
The US model BIT prohibits the imposition of performance requirements, including 
domestic-content targets, export and import quotas, and technology transfer (among 
other areas) as a condition for the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, 
conduct, operation or sale of an investment covered under a BIT. 
In some instances, such as in the BIT with Panama, exceptions have been made. The 
US-Panama BIT allows Panama to grant benefits to investors under its established 
incentive laws. 
The model US BIT contains clauses regarding both environmental and labour 
concerns. The clauses indicate that it is “inappropriate to encourage investment by 
weakening or reducing the protections afforded” in domestic environmental and 
labour laws, adding that labour laws include regulations related to the rights of 
association and collective bargaining, prohibition of forced labour, labour protections 
for children and young people, and acceptable work conditions. The model BIT does 
not, however, establish environmental or labour restrictions in addition to existing 
national laws. 
Strategic sectors and 
the “negative list” 
approach 
Performance requirements
Labour and the
environment
The role of CFIUS
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US BITs encourage initial efforts at dispute resolution to be made through consultation 
and negotiation between the claimant and respondent. Disputes that cannot be resolved 
through that process are settled under procedures established by the World Bank’s 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), assuming 
both the claimant and defendant countries are party to the ICSID Convention. If a 
dispute is not resolved through consultations or diplomatic channels, government-to-
government dispute settlement (that is, in national courts) would still be available to 
investors that encounter trouble. 
Some BITs have been revised to capture shifts in arbitration procedures. The US-
Uruguay BIT contains two such annexes: the first bars US investors from submitting 
certain types of claims under BIT channels that have already been submitted before a 
Uruguayan court or administrative tribunal; and the second bars investor cases 
claiming that a “negotiated restructuring” of a sovereign-debt instrument breaches any 
obligation under Section A of the BIT except national and most-favoured-nation 
obligations. 
In another instance, at the time of the 1982 US-Panama BIT (which entered into force 
in 1991), Panama was not party to the ICSID Convention, and the agreement was 
signed using the ICSID Additional Facility as the forum for arbitration. Following 
Panama’s accession to the ICSID Convention, the BIT was amended in 2000.  
During the early days of the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA), parties 
within the US were concerned that the use of international tribunals in cases brought 
by foreign investors under free-trade agreements (FTAs) and BITs would open the US 
to a deluge of claims. Further criticism surrounded the fact that, in contrast to US 
judges, the international tribunals were beyond the reach of US democracy and that 
many of the arbitrators would be foreign nationals with the power to render monetary 
judgments against the US government—the damages of which would ultimately be 
paid with taxpayer revenues. Such fears have proven unfounded. In the more than 15 
years since NAFTA entered into force, there have been only 15 cases brought against 
the United States, not one of which has required the US to pay a monetary award.  
Michael Snarr, counsel at Baker Hostetler, interviewed for this paper, describes an 
example of the process of bringing a property dispute by a foreign investor against the 
US as follows:  “As for raising the BIT in court, the challenge would not be to a trade 
court. The US Court of International Trade has a special, limited jurisdiction and 
would not have jurisdiction over a claim property dispute with a local, state or federal 
government, even if an argument were made about a BIT. Even if one were to go to a 
regular US federal district court, the case likely would be dismissed because the BITs 
or FTAs are explicit in limiting the rights of private persons to invoke the obligations 
in those agreements to the dispute-settlement mechanisms contained in the 
agreements. In other words, the district court would say that to the extent a foreign 
investor may claim any relief under the BIT, such relief is provided explicitly through 
the arbitration mechanisms in the agreement and not to be applied in US courts except 
to enforce an arbitration award rendered by a tribunal under the agreement.” 
Negotiation and ratification of US BITs follows a linear process. First, the US secretary 
of state authorises the negotiation process. Negotiation with the partner country on the 
terms of the individual BIT then proceeds. Once the two countries’ negotiators come to 
agreement on the terms and the secretary of state authorises the transmittal, the BIT goes 
Arbitration processes
Ratification process
in the US
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to the president for signature. Following presidential signature, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee considers the treaty, reporting its findings to the full Senate. The 
BIT then requires approval by a two-thirds majority in the Senate, at which point it 
enters into force. It is not uncommon for the elapsed time between the president’s 
signing of the treaty and Senate’s ratification of it to be several years, and for that period 
to straddle presidential administrations.6 
Impacts of BITs 
Overall, US BITs open channels for US companies to develop and expand their 
commercial interests internationally. BITs pave the way for US companies to set up 
export-distribution networks, provide services directly through branch and affiliate 
offices in situ, and engage in research and development to meet the demands of local 
needs while expanding sales markets. US BITs have positive effects on partner 
countries: US companies invest with more confidence (especially in countries that 
have had weak foreign-investment-protection measures); it opens bilateral 
communication channels on trade and investment; and these channels may lead to 
future agreements, such as a bilateral free-trade agreement. 
An analysis of US BITs with developing countries shows that when BIT agreements 
are in force (compared with those signed but awaiting ratification), there is an 
observable positive effect on the increase of inflows of US foreign direct investment 
(FDI). One such study, conducted at the University of Illinois at Chicago, examined 
investment-flow data from 1977-2004. This study shows that an active BIT increases 
the level of US FDI to a partner country, whereas a US BIT that is signed but not yet 
in force does not. There is often a two-to-three-year gap between the time an 
agreement is signed and the time it comes into force. 
Because of data constraints, it is difficult to examine the effect of BITs on FDI into 
specific sectors. Research in 2005 found that a higher number of BITs increases FDI 
flows into a developing country. Though the finding that BITs in some manner 
increase the level of FDI between signatories is the most common outcome of such 
studies, other reports reach different conclusions. One recent analysis, for example, 
finds “little evidence that existing international agreements—trade and investment 
framework agreements (TIFAs), BITs or preferential trade agreements (PTAs)—tend 
to increase investment in partner countries from the United States.”7 Data available 
from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis is included in the dataset accompanying 
this report.  
                                                          
6 http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webiteiia20069_en.pdf 
  
7 See http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/intranet/gies/Haftel_GIES.pdf; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=616242 and http://www.asil.org/files/ielconferencepapers/peinhardt.pdf 
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II. China’s current BITs with other countries 
Introduction 
China has emerged in recent years as the leading destination in the developing world 
for foreign direct investment (FDI). Moreover, China is also an increasingly important 
source for outward FDI, especially for developing countries in Africa, Latin America 
and Asia. Less-well noticed, however, has been the fact that China has now signed 
more than 120 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with other countries, ranking second 
in the world after Germany. These treaties are increasingly regarded as crucial not 
only for foreign investors in China, but also for Chinese companies investing abroad, 
providing them with the confidence to invest overseas without the risk of 
expropriation. 
 
 
 
China’s approach to BITs has changed significantly over the years, and the country’s 
BIT policy can be divided into three different periods. The first stage was from 1949 
(with the foundation of the People’s Republic of China) to 1981, the start of the period 
of openness and reform. During these years, China adopted an aggressive and hostile 
approach to foreign direct investment (FDI) and BITs in line with its overall ideology, 
including an opposition to concepts of private property. During this period, 
expropriations were frequent and without compensation. 
The second stage, 1982-97, witnessed a change in China’s attitude towards foreign 
investment, as the country opened up to the rest of the world following more than 30 
years of economic isolation. Eager to attract FDI, economic development became a 
priority for the government. As a result, China signed its first-ever BIT with the 
government of Sweden in 1982. Over the next 15 years, attitudes towards FDI evolved 
as the level of legal protection for foreign investors gradually increased, and by mid-
Chronology of China’s BITs
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1998 China had signed a total of 80 BITs. Despite this, the overall level of protection 
offered in these BITs was still fairly low. 
Since 1998, China has entered into increasingly sophisticated BITs. Indeed, China has 
now signed BITs with most of the world’s capital-exporting countries, including the 
UK, Japan, Germany and France. There is no BIT in force with the US; negotiations 
were terminated in 1989 following the Tiananmen Square massacre. Reflecting 
China’s increasingly important role as source of FDI in the developing world and the 
demand from Chinese companies for greater protection for their overseas investments, 
China has also now signed BITs with many developing countries in Asia, Africa, 
Eastern Europe and South America. 
As China has overcome its traditional and long-held scepticism towards international 
law, China’s BITs since 1998 have increasingly followed international best practice, 
and they are comparable to those found in more developed countries. These BITs 
provide a high level of protection to foreign investors, as well as unlimited access to 
dispute-settlement mechanisms, provisions on most-favoured-nation treatment and 
national treatment of foreign investors. This includes the recent high-profile BITs 
signed with the Netherlands in 2001 and Germany in 2003. 
Major themes and issues in China’s BITs8 
China was initially reluctant to consent to arbitration as a way to settle disputes in its 
BITs. Indeed, the first BIT with Sweden contained no investor-dispute provisions at 
all. But the lack of an effective and working arbitration process undermined the 
effectiveness of the BITs as a means of investor protection. 
This changed following the signing of a new generation of BITs in the late 1990s, 
when China began to agree to a proper dispute-settlement mechanism. The first BIT 
that provided for genuine dispute settlement was signed with Barbados in 1998. The 
fact that the first such BIT was signed with a developing country is significant: it 
implies that pressure from Chinese investors, concerned about the lack of protection 
they receive when investing abroad, might have persuaded the Chinese government to 
change its stance and to allow proper access to arbitration. An arbitration clause was 
also included in the June 2000 BIT signed with Botswana, when China consented to 
allow for international arbitration “for any dispute between an investor of one 
Contracting Party and the other Contracting Party” either through an ad hoc tribunal, 
or through the ICSID Convention. 
Dispute-resolution provisions were included in other BITs with developed countries, 
including that signed with Germany in 2003, whereby “any dispute concerning 
investments shall at the request of the other contracting state be submitted for 
arbitration”. Under the terms of this arbitration, investors are given the right to have 
their case referred to the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID). Under ICSID, dispute resolution is fully 
                                                          
8 Information for this section was drawn from a number of sources including: 
http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/jgp020, 
http://www.asil.org/files/teleconferencepapers/berger.pdf, http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1928, and 
http://www.amchamchina.org/article/4135. 
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comprehensive, and member states must “recognise an award ... as binding, and 
enforce it ... as if it were a final judgment of a court”. 
More discussion of this issue can be found in Section IV, p. 33. 
  
The most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment clause has been included in all of China’s 
most recent BITs. The inclusion of this clause has important implications, since under 
the MFN China is obligated to extend all the benefits of its new-generation BITs to 
countries that signed the more restrictive, old-generation BITs. 
The MFN clause aims to create a more equal and competitive landscape for all foreign 
investors regardless of nationality. This clause is especially important given that 
China’s most recent BITs grant substantially more access and protection to foreign 
investors, yet signatories of the old-generation, more restrictive BITs can now enjoy 
these benefits. 
Traditionally seen as one of the core guarantees provided in modern BITs, the 
extension of national treatment implies the creation of a level playing field for foreign 
and local investors alike to ensure fair and equal competition. Under national-
treatment provisions, governments must ensure that foreign governments provide 
equal treatment to foreign investors and that there is no discrimination on the grounds 
of nationality. 
China’s pre-1998 BITs typically did not include full national treatment. This reflected 
a determination within the Chinese government to promote Chinese companies as 
“national champions” and to ensure that the government could maintain as much 
control over the economy as possible. It was also a recognition that Chinese 
companies would struggle to compete against more-sophisticated, world-class 
companies. 
The first BIT to include a mention of national treatment was the China-UK BIT of 
1986. Even under the terms of this BIT, however, the provision was included whereby 
“the Contracting Party shall to the extent possible, accord (national) treatment”. The 
inclusion of the phrase “to the extent possible” was designed to ensure that no binding 
restrictions would be imposed. 
China’s newer generation of BITs, from 2001 onwards, began to include stricter 
national-treatment provisions, starting with the BIT signed with the Netherlands. Even 
in this case, though, there were still qualifications ensuring that the provisions were 
not completely binding. 
Indeed, China finally agreed to grant full and unqualified national-treatment 
provisions without reservations only for the BIT with the Seychelles, which was 
signed in 2007. The decision to allow national treatment was a major development in 
China’s BIT practice, and it has served to underline China’s increasing commitment to 
BIT best practice. It has also served as a mechanism to enforce the continued opening 
of the domestic economy to foreign competition. 
Significantly, since all of China’s BITs include most-favoured-nation clauses, the 
concessions offered in the Seychelles BIT are available to all foreign investors. 
A security-protection guarantee is standard in China’s BITs and requires the state to 
provide protection against physical interference—such as rioting and 
Most-favoured-nation 
treatment 
 
National treatment
Security protection
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demonstrations—in the host country. This guarantee is especially valuable for less-
stable regimes in Africa, where destruction of physical assets is more likely to be a 
problem. 
Protection against expropriation is an especially important guarantee in China, 
following the large-scale seizure and nationalisation of foreign assets after the Chinese 
Communist Party came to power in 1949. Although expropriation is much less likely 
to be an issue for foreign investors at the moment, the guarantee is included in all 
China’s BITs. 
China’s old generation of BITs did not often adhere to best practice in the area of 
compensation, which under the most modern and comprehensive BITs demands 
“prompt, adequate and effective compensation”. China’s new-generation BITs have 
clarified this issue. The 2003 China-Germany BIT, for example, requires that 
“compensation shall be equivalent to the value of the investment immediately before 
the expropriation is taken” and that the “compensation is paid without delay and shall 
carry interest.” Foreign investors remain concerned, however, over the calculation of 
the exact level of compensation under China’s present BIT terms. 
In China’s old generation of investment treaties, capital-transfer provisions were strict 
by design. China aimed to ensure control over all foreign exchange entering and 
exiting the country in order to maintain control over the exchange rate. Yet the country 
increasingly recognised that capital-transfer restrictions were not compatible with the 
goal of encouraging FDI into the country, since companies are unwilling to invest in a 
country that does not allow repatriation of profits. Capital-transfer provisions were 
gradually eroded, and in the 2003 China-Germany BIT they were broken altogether, 
allowing for unlimited capital transfer. Most-favoured-nation provisions also add to 
the scenario for foreign investors with their concurrent favourable provisions. 
Foreign investors can open and maintain foreign-exchange accounts if approved by 
the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). SAFE will determine the 
amount of foreign exchange that a company needs; deposits exceeding this level must 
be converted to local currency. Authorised foreign investors can retain foreign 
exchange equivalent to 50% of their export earnings. China now has a relatively 
liberal approach, allowing foreign investors to repatriate legally earned profits if the 
company involved can produce the appropriate paperwork. Foreign businesses in 
China rarely mention the issue as a major problem, which may be partly because most 
companies in China reinvest the vast majority of their earned profits in their China-
based ventures. Nevertheless, the government has gradually been stepping up its 
monitoring of some of the channels used to repatriate profits, which has raised the 
administrative burden associated with these paths. Transfer pricing, for example, is 
increasingly subject to regulatory scrutiny to ensure that intra-company pricing is 
reasonable; some companies think that the authorities’ judgment of what is reasonable 
is at odds with their own. Another example is royalty payments. As mentioned 
elsewhere in the report, some foreign investors have reported that the government is 
putting pressure on them to reduce royalty payments, registering more intellectual 
property in their China-based vehicles. Capital-account transactions are more tightly 
restricted under China’s closed capital-account system, and they require case-by-case 
approval. As a result, foreign investors report that receiving regulatory approval for 
injections of capital to expand businesses can sometimes be difficult (especially if the 
authorities are trying to limit inflows of liquidity into the economy from abroad). 
Protection against
expropriation
Amount of compensation 
 
Capital transfer
Capital movement 
and profit 
repatriation 
 
16 Briefing paper:  Evaluating a potential US-China BIT 
Country and Economic Research www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010 
 
 
One of the most controversial aspects of BITs has been the introduction of the so-
called “umbrella clause”, now included in about half of all of China’s BITs. Most BITs 
cover areas such as the violation of national-treatment provisions and expropriations, 
which typically involve protection against interference from government power. 
However, there are many cases where an investor may be more concerned about the 
willingness of another company, and not of the government, to fulfil its contractual 
obligations. 
Protection against commercial breaches of contract can be covered under the umbrella 
clause of a BIT, which according to the Germany-China BIT stipulates that “each 
Contracting Party shall observe any other obligation it has entered into with regard to 
investments in its territory by investors of the other Contracting Party”. Although 
China was traditionally wary of allowing such clauses into its BITs, the new-
generation BITs typically include such provisions. 
The clause means that a foreign investor can take to arbitration any company in breach 
of an investment contract. This provides significant benefits to a foreign company, 
which will be able to depend on a transparent, international-dispute-resolution 
mechanism, rather than on the local Chinese arbitration courts, which have been 
criticised as slow and lacking in transparency. 
Impacts of BITs 
As noted earlier, the level of inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) into China 
have increased rapidly in recent years, making China the largest recipient of FDI in 
the developing world. FDI inflows into China were just US$400m (on a balance-of-
payments basis) in 1982, increasing to US$11.2bn in 1992, US$44.2bn in 2001 (the 
year of China’s entry into World Trade Organisation), and then to a record 
US$147.8bn in 2008. Meanwhile, outward FDI, which was just US$44m in 1982, 
grew to US$913m in 1991 and US$6.9bn in 2001; it has ballooned over the past 
couple of years, reaching US$17.8bn in 2006 and a record US$53.4bn in 2008.9  
                                                          
9 Data for this section from National Bureau of Statistics. 
Umbrella clause
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Inflows of FDI into China have increased for a number of reasons: 
• the increasing number and sophistication of China’s BITs; 
• explosive growth in China’s economy, which has encouraged more companies to 
invest in the country as a way to access the booming domestic market; 
• China’s low labour costs (see table on the next page), efficient workforce and 
improving infrastructure, which has allowed China to establish itself as a 
manufacturing export power-house, attracting billions of US dollars in FDI from 
foreign companies in the process; 
• China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation in late 2001. 
 
18 Briefing paper:  Evaluating a potential US-China BIT 
Country and Economic Research www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010 
 
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
5,000
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Brazil China Germany India Indonesia United States
Note: 2009-14 are EIU forecasts.
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
Average monthly wage
(US$)
 
 
The investment environment in China has greatly improved since the country’s WTO 
accession in December 2001, tariff reductions have been implemented on schedule 
and most market-access measures are in operation. As a result, a significant number of 
markets have been opened to investment. In the banking sector, for example, 
restrictions on local-currency business by foreign banks have been eased, and 
geographical and customer restrictions on renminbi services have been removed. 
Foreign companies involved in logistics and distribution have expanded their business 
scope, with restrictions lifted on foreign ownership for freight forwarding, 
warehousing and other operations. The protectionist telecoms sector has also seen 
major changes, with foreign-equity limits raised. In addition, regulatory restrictions on 
foreign investment in tourism were lifted as from July 1st 2007, in line with China’s 
WTO commitments to allow foreign travel agencies to set up branch offices 
nationwide. Since 2004, foreign investors have also been allowed to take full 
ownership of hotels. 
China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 has also driven changes in the pharmaceuticals 
sector, where innovative pharmaceutical companies can now carry out research and 
development (R&D) because of fewer concerns over poor intellectual-property 
protection. Foreign investment in this sector has boomed, and most of the world’s 
largest foreign companies have established R&D centres in China. These companies 
include GlaxoSmithKline and AstraZeneca (both of the UK), Roche and Novartis 
(both of Switzerland) and Bayer (of Germany). However, the foreign pharmaceutical 
company with the biggest presence in China is Pfizer (of the US), which has a total 
staff of around 4,000 and production plants in Dalian, Suzhou and Wuxi. Overall, 
Pfizer has invested more than US$500m in China. Significantly, all of this has 
occurred in the absence of a US-China BIT; suggesting that not having a BIT signed 
and enacted with China does not present a huge obstacle for foreign companies. The 
same is also true in China’s automotive sector, which has received billions in foreign 
investment in recent years, and where one of the biggest investors has been General 
Motors (also of the US). 
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Aside from the United States, China has signed BITs with most of the world’s 
developed countries. The emphasis most recently has been on signing BITs with less-
developed countries, especially oil- and commodity-rich countries in Africa and Latin 
America that can provide much needed inputs for China’s booming economy. From 
the perspective of a Chinese company, many of which have little experience investing 
in foreign countries, the increased confidence and legal support available through a 
BIT (giving Chinese companies the right to appeal for international arbitration, for 
example, in the event of the expropriation of a mine in a foreign country) explains 
much of the surge in outward FDI by China to the developing world in recent years. 
WTO Commitments 10   The US Trade Representative (USTR) released its annual 
report in late December, assessing how well China is doing in meeting the 
commitments it signed up to as part of its WTO accession agreement of 2001. 
Although the overall message of the report was mixed, and though some “concrete 
results” had been achieved over the past year, big concerns remained on how well 
China is complying with its WTO obligations. The main complaint focused on 
concerns that China is not taking adequate measure to enforce its own intellectual-
property laws, despite a number of anti-piracy campaigns that it has launched in recent 
years. Altogether, the USTR estimates that US software and music companies suffered 
losses of around US$3.5bn as a result of poor enforcement of the laws. 
The report was also critical of other aspects of China’s trade regime. In agriculture, 
where China has generally met all of its commitments, US companies still suffered 
from unpredictable practices, which in 2009 led to shipments of agricultural products 
from the US being held up at customs in China. China was also guilty of limiting 
market access for foreign companies, such as through the inclusion of the “Buy 
China” policies included in the government’s stimulus package, along with 
complicated new standards in telecommunications, which were designed for the 
benefit of Chinese telecoms companies. The USTR report was also critical of China’s 
new postal law, which the report claims excludes foreign companies from a 
“significant” part of the rapid-delivery market in China. 
Conclusion 
Although the Chinese government has traditionally been slow to grant significant 
rights to foreign investors that could be enforced through international arbitration, this 
is now changing. The past few years has seen a number of developments to China’s 
BIT regime. These changes have significantly extended the protections offered to 
foreign investors in China from interference from the government. 
Although China signed a number of BITs in the 1980s and early 1990s, it was not until 
the late 1990s that the basis for the present agreements emerged. With China’s role as 
a leading destination for foreign direct investment, and with growing demands by the 
international community for greater foreign-investment protection, the country 
eventually agreed to comprehensive expansion of the protections offered to investors. 
China’s most recent BITs are now comprehensive and include all of the rights found in 
the most substantive BITs in force around the world today. These include the 
following: 
                                                          
10 See http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1572 for more information. 
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• protection against expropriation and discriminatory action from the 
government;  
• unhindered transfer of profits back from China;  
• the right of investors in China to start binding-arbitration proceedings against 
the government, which can be enforced by the World Bank. 
 
 
III. The potential US-China BIT 
Key issues 
China continues to make progress in fighting intellectual piracy 11 . However, the 
degree of protection of intellectual piracy remains well below the level that most of its 
trading partners expect, and this is likely to remain a major source of dispute. Piracy 
problems are still common in almost every sector of the Chinese economy, including 
media, software, electronics, industrial goods, consumer goods, pharmaceuticals and 
food products. Indeed, the US Trade Representative (USTR) estimated that 85-93% of 
all copyright products sold in China in 2007 were pirated, showing little improvement 
over the previous year. 
Despite the poor level of overall intellectual-property-rights (IPR) protection, China 
has not stood still in its efforts to address the IPR issue. Since joining the World Trade 
Organisation in December 2001, Beijing has worked hard to strengthen its IPR 
regime, including the revision of major laws on patents, copyrights and trademarks in 
line with the requirements of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) agreements of the WTO. China is already party to several other major 
international conventions on IPR. The government has issued numerous official 
notices and amendments on specific areas, such as pharmaceuticals, Internet domain 
names and software piracy. In some, especially where these involve trademark 
infringement, solid remedies are available against infringers, and the situation 
continues to improve, especially in large urban areas. Patents, too, can often be 
effectively protected, though the enforcement procedure is tortuous. However, 
copyright protection, especially for music, films and computer software, remains a 
weak area. 
Although the range of enforcement options open to victims of piracy in China 
continues to increase, the reality is that even though the central government wants to 
stop counterfeiting, its ability to enforce rules, especially in remote regions, is limited. 
Factors that hamper enforcement efforts include local protectionism, insufficient 
manpower and the absence of effective deterrent measures. 
Moreover, the situation is unlikely to change soon for several reasons, including the 
following major issues: 
                                                          
11  Intellectual-property-protection information derived from the Economist Intelligence Unit’s China Hand: 
http://portal.eiu.com/ 
index.asp?layout=displayIssueTOC&toc2=no&issue_1024946887&publication_id=870003687. 
Intellectual-property
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• Toothless agencies: most lack the funding—and often the willpower—to 
implement laws; 
• Costs of litigation: the costs and complexities of pursuing counterfeiters through 
China’s legal system are often prohibitive; 
• Lack of training, and inadequate, non-transparent processes. 
More generally, it is hard to escape the conclusion that enforcement of intellectual-
property rights is a low-priority issue for most government officials. 
The US is by far the largest of China’s trade partners, with a relationship that is also 
the most problematic. China’s massive trade surplus with the US is a strain on bilateral 
relations. Nonetheless, under the Clinton and Bush administrations, the US maintained 
a policy of “strategic dialogue”, with both presidents arguing that it is better to talk 
with China than confront it. The Obama administration has begun a review of the 
process but is unlikely to change this overall stance. 
Chinese statistics traditionally underestimate the size of Sino-US trade, as they do not 
distinguish between direct exports and transshipments through Hong Kong, whereas 
US statistics overestimate the size by combining both figures. Regardless of which 
statistics are used, the bilateral trade deficit between the US and China grew rapidly in 
2005-08. However, the size of the bilateral trade deficit is forecast to shrink over the 
next few years, with import growth into the US likely to be blunted by the need for 
households to rebuild their savings, following a collapse in property and share prices 
over the past year. Meanwhile, continued strong growth in China (albeit down from 
the levels in 2003-07) should support relatively buoyant import growth in that country. 
The US government will continue to press for a much greater appreciation of the 
Chinese currency this year, which it cites as the main cause of the bilateral trade 
deficit. However, American criticism of China will be blunted by the need to win the 
latter’s support in several areas, not least in budget financing—China was the top 
buyer of US Treasury bonds in 2008. Meanwhile, the Chinese will be reluctant to 
allow a rapid appreciation of the currency amid concern on how this would affect the 
competitiveness of its exports. 
The US Trade Representative’s annual report to Congress on China’s WTO 
compliance, released in December 2008, maintained the relatively conciliatory note 
struck the previous year. While noting the various areas in which China continues to 
fall short, it also emphasised the progress made in bilateral talks, which had improved 
the access of US companies to Chinese markets for agricultural and other products. 
The Chinese government abandoned the renminbi’s decade-old fixed exchange rate in 
July 2005, when it revalued the currency by 2.1% and replaced the peg to the US 
dollar with a managed float. The move came in response to strong pressure from the 
US government and a booming trade surplus. 
Despite strong pressure from China’s main trading partners to allow the renminbi to 
appreciate faster against the US dollar, the Chinese currency has remained fixed 
against the dollar since July 2008. The Chinese government will probably remain very 
cautious in the operation of its exchange-rate policy, and it is highly unlikely to bow to 
pressure from trade partners for a large-scale revaluation or even a faster rate of 
appreciation. The Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts that, as part of a gradual 
The trade balance
The RMB exchange rate
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tightening, the government will adjust its policy stance, allowing the renminbi to 
resume a slow but steady rise against the US dollar from around mid-2010 onwards. 
Despite the problems that it causes for exporters, appreciation of the renminbi is 
desirable, as it should help to cut the huge surpluses on China’s capital and current 
accounts, which are contributing significantly to global economic imbalances. A BIT 
agreement between China and the US would give the US no extra leverage over 
China’s exchange-rate policy. Indeed, the BIT negotiations would not be the best 
forum for the US to pressure China on the exchange rate. Instead, these discussions 
should occur during the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) negotiations. 
The US government and China’s other main trade partners have consistently argued 
that the renminbi is undervalued. In making these arguments, they have pointed to 
three factors, namely China’s huge foreign-exchange reserves, the country’s vast 
current-account surplus and the fact that goods in China are still much cheaper than in 
the US. The US and China’s other major trade partners may put further pressure on the 
Chinese government to allow faster appreciation of the renminbi. However, China’s 
crucial role in resolving the ongoing global financial crisis means that both the EU and 
the US will be careful not to alienate the Chinese authorities through the use of 
threats. 
There remains significant debate within the Chinese government over the rate at which 
the government should allow the currency to rise. The Ministry of Commerce, for 
example, would prefer to see a much slower rate of appreciation in order to support 
exporters. Despite the problems that a faster appreciation rate may cause for exporters, 
a further rise in the value of the renminbi is desirable since it should help to cut the 
huge surpluses on China’s capital and current accounts, which are contributing 
significantly to current global economic imbalances. By cutting the cost of imported 
goods, the renminbi’s appreciation should also help the rebalancing of China’s 
domestic economy, by encouraging private consumption. But the government will 
remain wary of the potential social costs of a continued strengthening of the renminbi, 
and in the event of a major slowdown in economic growth, the pace of appreciation 
may be slowed or possibly even reversed. 
By almost any standards, China’s environmental problems are severe12. Air and water 
pollution, water scarcity, desertification, land contamination and health problems 
among residents of heavily polluted areas are major issues. China’s cities are among 
the most polluted on earth, with the country home to 16 of the 20 most-polluted cities 
in the world, according to the World Bank. Water pollution is just as serious a 
problem. This is exacerbated by the fact that only around 50% of urban sewage is 
treated, and some 278 of China’s 661 cities had no sewage-treatment plants as at end-
2005. 
The prevailing political culture and regulatory structures have exacerbated 
environmental problems. One of the features of China’s economic boom over the past 
decade and a half has been a rapacious growth-first mentality among businessmen and 
politicians. With officials largely rewarded for attracting investment and delivering 
strong economic growth, this has led to the approval of countless projects without due 
regard for their environmental impact. Simply put, China’s present position is 
                                                          
12 Economist Intelligence Unit: Asia Regional Overview, July 2006 article by Mary Boyd, found at  
http://www.eiu.com. 
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unsustainable. Without more-efficient use of energy and water, its environmental 
problems will worsen as the economy continues to grow rapidly and as per-capita 
prosperity rises. 
China’s government is unquestionably paying closer attention to environmental 
sustainability. Thus far, however, it has failed to meet the main targets for reducing 
pollution, and structural constraints continue to hamper it. The most fundamental 
change is that an environmental agenda is now more clearly articulated in high-level 
policy. The 11th Five-Year Plan (covering 2006-10) emphasises sustainable GDP 
growth and the quality, not quantity, of economic output. The plan sets specific 
environmental targets, including for energy efficiency, discharges of major pollutants, 
forest cover, as well as improvements in the efficiency of industrial and agricultural 
water use, and more waste-water treatment. 
China is doing a lot to tackle its environmental crisis, but it faces a colossal task. The 
central government recognises the seriousness of the situation and is adjusting policy 
accordingly. But whether it has the ability and political will to effect change on the 
scale needed is far from certain. For one thing, though spending has increased, China 
is not spending enough money; the government invested only 1.3% of GDP on 
environmental-protection treatments in 2005, still below the 2% recommended by the 
World Bank. 
Nevertheless, efforts to introduce cleaner technology, to reduce emissions and to 
increase penalties for environmental transgressions will continue to gain momentum. 
At the same time, a drive to increase massively the use of nuclear power and 
renewable energy sources will continue. More progress would be possible if China 
improved its institutional framework. It should aim to consolidate supervisory 
agencies and give more power to key bodies such as the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection (MEP), the main environmental-regulatory authority. 
Foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) face the same environmental and building 
restrictions that apply to domestic enterprises—though many complain that they face 
more-rigorous enforcement of the rules. Part of the official rationale behind such 
double standards is that foreign companies have longer experience with environmental 
protection and should therefore meet stricter requirements. State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) generally pose a far greater threat to the environment, but realistically, SOEs 
are probably too well connected with local authorities to face strict requirements on a 
level anywhere near the ones imposed on FIEs. 
China’s film, entertainment and broadcasting sector remain largely off-limits to 
foreign investors. 13  Liberalisation of this sector will probably lag behind others. 
Indeed, following China’s entry to the WTO in 2001, the film and media sector was 
one of those that remain most protected from foreign competition. The restrictions 
facing foreign companies in this sector are wide-ranging, including a restriction that 
allows just 20 foreign films to be legally shown in China each year; a sophisticated 
Internet firewall that prevents most western news websites from being viewed in 
China; and a media business (including radio and TV stations, newspapers, magazines 
and film production) that is largely off-limits to foreign companies. 
                                                          
13 Information for this section is drawn from http://www.amchamchina.org/article/4135. 
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Although the government claims that these restrictions are in place to protect China’s 
domestic companies from foreign competition, the reality is that the media sector in 
China is viewed as being too politically sensitive to be thrown completely open to 
foreign companies. The government’s overwhelming priority is to maintain social 
stability; this is achievable only if the government can maintain a tight grip on all 
public access to information. As a result, the liberalisation of this sector will probably 
lag significantly behind the rest of the economy. 
Labour standards are improving across China, and the country already has a number of 
pieces of legislation in place designed to protect worker’s rights in the country.14 
However, although China has introduced much new legislation in recent years, the 
unhealthy relationship between corrupt local officials and local businessmen will 
remain the main stumbling block in the path of progress on labour rights. China also 
has only a patchy ability to implement existing law. Breaches are often investigated 
only when senior officials order action; the realities of the political system heavily 
compromise efforts by the police and other agencies that are meant to detect illegal 
behaviour. 
The most important piece of labour legislation China has introduced in the reform era 
is the Labour Contract Law (LCL), which took effect on January 1st 2008. The new 
law replaces one put into place in 1995. Although China has emerged since then as an 
attractive manufacturing base, concerns have grown over poor labour conditions—
hence, the new law that, on paper, dramatically changes the balance of power between 
workers and employers 
Companies will need written contracts with all full-time employees, and anyone who 
works for more than four hours a day will probably be considered a full-time 
employee. Once they are full-time, employees who are laid off must be bought out at a 
multiple of their average monthly salary. It is permissible to make more than 20 
employees, or 10% of the workforce, redundant, but this must be done on the basis of 
seniority, not merit. The law is supposed to provide greater job security. Workers with 
ten years or more of service will have open-ended contracts, and companies will have 
to inform unions before sacking anyone. Employers fear the law will mean bigger 
severance payments. 
The new law has been a boon to the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), 
an umbrella organisation for all China’s unions, which in many ways acts as an arm of 
government. But the ACFTU it has seen its power eroded in recent years as state-
owned industries have collapsed and the private sector has flourished, eschewing 
niceties such as unions and Communist Party cells. Despite strong claims by the 
ACFTU, it is not expected to emerge as a new champion of workers’ rights. 
Independent trade unions will remain in effect illegal; China has no plans to 
reintroduce the right to strike, which it abolished in 1982. 
One of the main complaints is that the new law does nothing to improve the lot of tens 
of millions of migrant workers from the countryside. They make up most of the 
unskilled labour in urban areas and are the most frequent victims of poor labour 
conditions. China’s official trade unions have yet to build a network among such 
workers. Moreover, many companies will continue efforts to evade the law or else 
                                                          
14 Source:  Economist Intelligence Unit’s China Hand. 
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simply ignore it. Moreover, the law was introduced in mid-2007, when the economy 
was still growing strongly and many companies could afford the increased provisions. 
However, the sharp economic downturn at the end of 2008 (which has left many 
companies struggling to survive) has meant the enforcement of the law can be 
described as patchy at best. 
Following China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation, foreign banks have 
gradually been allowed greater scope for their investments in permissible business and 
geographical areas. Foreign banks, long limited to doing business in local currency 
with foreign companies, were allowed to conduct business in the local currency with 
Chinese enterprises as from December 1st 2003. They gained access to renminbi 
business with local individuals in December 2006. Foreign banks’ geographical scope 
for renminbi business was fully liberalised in late 2006. 
Nevertheless, it will be cumbersome for foreign banks to take full advantage of the 
opening of the banking sector mandated by the WTO. Under these rules, foreign-
funded or joint-venture banks will have to incorporate in China with registered capital 
of Rmb1bn (US$145m). For each branch they open, they will have to allocate another 
Rmb100m in operating capital. The WTO agreement also specifies that foreign 
financial institutions, in order to be allowed to do renminbi business, must have a 
three-year record of accomplishment for operations in China and must have been 
profitable for two consecutive years prior to application. 
July 2009 Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
The latest incarnation of US-Chinese talks, which took place in Washington DC on 
July 27th-28th, emphasised both sides’ hopes for greater co-operation, but they 
ultimately agreed upon little of substance.15 The US-China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue, as these subtly renamed talks are now called, produced a memorandum of 
understanding on climate change and routine statements of commitment to free trade, 
balanced economic growth and security co-operation. But despite the lack of specific 
measures, the tone of the talks was encouraging. It suggests that the US and China 
recognise their increased mutual dependence and see the value of being less combative 
in future discussions. 
Emphasising the rising profile of Sino-US relations, the talks opened with a speech by 
Barack Obama. The US president stressed the importance of increased co-operation 
between the world’s sole superpower and the world’s fastest-growing major 
developing country. The new talks supersede the Strategic Economic Dialogue format 
launched in 2006, adding an “and” to the title to highlight a shift in focus from purely 
economic issues to a broader range of economic, environmental and diplomatic topics. 
Whereas the old format was spearheaded, on the US side, by the Treasury department 
and focused on resolving economic disputes between the two countries—most notably 
over China’s exchange-rate policy—the new talks had a strong foreign-policy angle as 
well. This was visible in the prominent involvement of the US secretary of state, 
Hillary Clinton, in addition to the Treasury secretary, Timothy Geithner. 
Relaunching the talks with a broader agenda reflects unspoken recognition that the old 
format did not work that well. In part, this may have reflected Chinese frustration with 
                                                          
15 Information derived from http://ustreas.gov/initiatives/us-china. 
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the US’s fixation on a single issue—the exchange rate—and a feeling that the 
supposed “dialogue” was more like a twice-yearly lecture on currency policy. 
However, the fall-out from the global financial and economic crisis has made it harder 
for the US to advocate its economic world view, and there is a chance that the new 
Strategic and Economic Dialogue could offer more genuinely two-sided debate. 
A key focus of discussion in Washington was global warming and climate change. 
China’s booming economy, huge population and energy-intensive, inefficient 
industrial sector have made the country the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide. 
As a result, China is now central to any global climate-change initiative. There is 
growing recognition in China’s government of the seriousness of the country’s own 
environmental problems, as well as of the potentially dramatic consequences of failing 
to halt global warming. Nevertheless, China’s central role in the search for a co-
ordinated multilateral solution to global warming will probably be awkward, given the 
concurrent need for China’s leadership to sustain rapid economic growth. This 
dilemma has big consequences for international co-operation. China (along with India) 
is strongly opposed to any plan that would impose binding emissions targets on all 
countries. China has argued that since developed countries are historically responsible 
for the high levels of carbon dioxide already in the atmosphere, they should pay the 
majority of the costs of any clean-up. This attitude, despite its undeniable logic, will 
make even harder the task of finding a viable solution to the problem of climate 
change. 
The United States, under President Obama, is committed to combating climate change, 
but it is well aware that any global solution must involve not just the US (and other 
developed economies) but also China and other large developing countries. Although 
the positions of developed and developing countries remain entrenched, China will not 
want to be labelled the world’s environmental villain. 
Unsurprisingly, given the two countries’ continuing differences, there were no major 
agreements at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. But the two sides signed a 
memorandum of understanding committing to more bilateral discussions in future. 
Both the US and China are keenly aware of the importance of achieving progress at 
the UN climate-change summit in Copenhagen later this year. That said, China is 
unlikely to make substantial concessions in terms of targets in Copenhagen. 
Possible co-operation over North Korea was also high on the agenda in Washington. 
The US is increasingly concerned over the irrational behaviour of North Korea, which 
carried out another nuclear test on May 25th and subsequently tested a number of 
short-range missiles. The US would like China, North Korea’s one-time close ally, to 
exert more pressure on the regime. From China’s viewpoint, North Korea’s behaviour 
is increasingly embarrassing. Although China’s influence over North Korea is often 
overstated, China alone has the economic leverage to force the regime back to the 
negotiating table. Amid concerns in China that the threat from North Korea may 
encourage Japan to abandon aspects of its pacifist constitution, China may consider 
putting more pressure on North Korea. However, China remains concerned over the 
implications of regime collapse in North Korea. This could result in a massive 
humanitarian crisis, with hundreds of thousands of starving North Koreans streaming 
over the border into China. This concern, and the fear in China that tougher measures 
on North Korea could exacerbate the regime’s erratic belligerence, means that China is 
not likely to exert as much pressure as the US would like. 
Climate change and 
global warming
North Korea
Briefing paper:  Evaluating a potential US-China BIT 27 
Country and Economic Research www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010 
 
Of the economic issues that were discussed, the most important was the rebalancing of 
Chinese GDP growth away from its traditional dependence on exports and investment. 
The US hopes that if the Chinese economy is driven more by private consumption, it 
will boost Chinese import demand and help to lift the US and other economies out of 
recession. The Chinese increasingly recognise that the growth model that has served 
China so well in the past (a cheap currency, strong exports and super-powered 
investment growth) will not be viable until the US and EU economies recover their 
previous vigour. Even then, it will be in China’s long-term interest to achieve more-
balanced growth. 
China is gradually introducing measures to support private consumption, such as the 
establishment of a comprehensive social-security system (which should help reduce 
consumers’ incentive to save). However, these measures will take many years to be 
effective, and are unlikely to have much effect on supporting demand in the short 
term. Meanwhile, the Chinese government has shied away from bolder measures, such 
as allowing a faster appreciation of the renminbi. A big revaluation of the local 
currency would lift consumers’ real purchasing power and give companies an 
incentive to shift resources into production for the domestic market. However, with 
exports still plunging, policymakers in China are reluctant to let the renminbi rise too 
fast. 
Also high on the agenda at the forum was the safety of Chinese investments in the US. 
This comes amid concern that record low interest rates in the US, and the country’s 
huge fiscal deficit, will eventually lead to the re-emergence of inflation, hitting the 
value of China’s investments. Owing to China’s exchange-rate policy, which has seen 
the renminbi closely track the US dollar, the value of China’s foreign-currency 
reserves exceeded US$2trn in the second quarter of 2009, after the Chinese 
government was forced to intervene in foreign-exchange markets to prevent the 
renminbi from appreciating against its US counterpart. Although such measures have 
enabled the US to keep interest rates low, they have left the Chinese holding an 
estimated US$800bn worth of US Treasuries, the value of which is vulnerable to a fall 
in the US dollar or to the re-emergence of inflation. 
The latest Strategic and Economic Dialogue may end up being remembered not for 
what was discussed, but for what was not. Whereas discussions of the renminbi and 
China’s mounting trade surplus with the US dominated previous meetings, those 
issues barely figured this time. This is despite the fact that the renminbi has not 
appreciated at all against the US dollar over the past 12 months, having been stuck at 
Rmb6.83:US$1 since July 2008. The US has traditionally blamed the “under-valued” 
Chinese currency as a major cause of the US trade deficit, and of the global 
imbalances that arguably contributed to the current crisis. The fact that this issue did 
not feature reflects the lack of economic leverage that the US now has over China, and 
the US’s dependence on Chinese purchases of its debt to fund its huge fiscal deficit. 
The Americans remain aware that a decision by China to allow its currency to float 
freely would necessitate less Chinese intervention in foreign-exchange markets. This 
could lead to a sharp rise in US interest rates, which would risk deepening the US 
recession. 
Economic rebalancing
No discussion of the renminbi
28 Briefing paper:  Evaluating a potential US-China BIT 
Country and Economic Research www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010 
 
Obama visit in November 200916. US President Barack Obama paid his first visit to 
China on November 15th-18th 2009, and though the BIT talks were not the focus of 
the trip, both sides did agree to expedite the negotiations. Despite Mr Obama’s visit, 
trade frictions between the United States and China have continued to rise. The overall 
tone of Mr Obama’s visit to China was of an increasingly assertive China listening, 
but clearly not paying much heed, to US concerns. The US president’s addresses were 
not televised live in the country, whereas China delivered a volley of demands and 
criticism of its own. 
The meeting between the US president and China’s top leaders may have built a base 
for future improvements in relations. Optimists note that Mr Obama’s strategy of 
limiting to private discussions criticism of China’s policies in areas such as human 
rights may be more productive than public dressings-down. However, the two sides 
were able to point to remarkably few areas of agreement on the main issues of 
controversy, such as China’s exchange-rate regime and its policy towards Iran, or US 
tariffs on Chinese products, such as tyres. A few minor deals were reached on 
promoting co-operation in fields such as space exploration and measures to tackle 
climate change, but these represented unimpressive results for so high profile a visit. 
Areas of controversy 
The negotiations between the US and China over a BIT are likely to be long and 
tortuous. As with the negotiations for China’s entry to the WTO in 2001, the US will 
probably demand a number of wide-ranging concessions from China. At the same 
time, however, China has emerged as an increasingly important investor in the US and 
will itself demand some concessions from the US before any agreement is made. 
There are three issues, however, that look to cause the most amount of disagreement 
and controversy. 
China is growing increasingly concerned that its investments in the US are being 
hampered by national-security restrictions. Under the terms of the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS; an inter-agency committee of the 
United States government), all foreign investments into the US are reviewed in order 
to consider their national-security implications for the US. This follows the failure in 
2008 of a US$2.2bn bid for 3Com, a US Internet equipment maker, by a Chinese 
company, Huawei Technologies. The bid failed over concern in the US government 
over Huawei’s relationship with China’s military and government. The failed bid drew 
comparisons with the high-profile failure, also on national-security grounds, of the 
attempt in 2005 by China National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC) to take over Unocal, 
a US oil company, in a deal valued at US$18.5bn. 
The failure of these deals sent the message that these large national companies are 
considered to be controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and as such are 
potential tools for the Chinese government in achieving its strategic objectives. There 
was concern that allowing the CCP access to a strategic energy source such as oil (as 
in the CNOOC case), or sensitive information technology (as in the Huawei example) 
would have constituted a national-security risk. 
                                                          
16 http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14915086. 
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Protectionism in the area of government procurement is another issue that may cause 
controversy in the negotiations. This follows the unveiling of massive fiscal-stimulus 
packages in both the United States and China in order to support their economies 
during the current global economic downturn, and the appearance of “Buy America” 
and “Buy China” clauses in their respective fiscal-stimulus packages, which raised 
concerns over each country’s commitment to free trade. Despite the controversy 
caused by the appearance of the “Buy China” clause, Chinese law at present allows 
government purchasing from foreign suppliers only under “exceptional” 
circumstances. 
Under the terms of China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation in 2001, it 
promised to apply to join the government-procurement agreement (GPA; a trade pact 
that prevents member countries from discriminating against each other’s goods and 
services in government-procurement projects). Despite these promises, China is now 
only into its second year of negotiations to join the GPA. China appears in no great 
rush to join, since the present system allows the government to discriminate in favour 
of Chinese companies when giving out contracts under its own US$586bn fiscal-
stimulus package. The government would be very reluctant to give up this system, 
since it lets the government influence and promote certain strategic sectors, such as 
technology and energy, by awarding certain big contracts to favoured companies. 
The risk of rising protectionism from the US (following President Obama’s decision to 
impose tariffs on imported tyres from China) will make China increasingly keen to 
secure market-economy status (MES) from the US. On joining the WTO in 2001, 
China agreed to be recognised as a transition economy for 15 years before 
automatically being granted MES in 2016. Eight years after China’s accession, some 
79 countries have already granted it MES. However, the US, EU and Japan have not 
done so. Without MES, it is easier for countries to bring anti-dumping cases against 
China. Under WTO rules, most countries can be found guilty of dumping if they 
export products at lower prices than those charged in their domestic markets. But 
because of China’s status as a transition economy, when WTO members try to 
determine market rates for Chinese goods, they can use costs from “surrogate” trading 
partners, which usually have higher production and labour costs than China. This 
almost invariably causes Chinese prices to appear artificially low, making dumping 
allegations easier to prove. 
China embarked on a high-profile campaign in 2004 to persuade its trading partners to 
recognise it as a market economy, citing the economic reforms that it has 
implemented. China was especially piqued that Russia, which has still to be admitted 
to the WTO, has been accorded MES by the US in its ongoing WTO application 
process. Indeed, it appeared as though the EU was ready to grant China MES in 2009, 
but it gave up owing to objections from the US. Having made little progress, China 
appeared to have abandoned its mission and concentrated its efforts on negotiating 
bilateral free-trade agreements with individual countries or regional groupings. 
However, the Chinese once again appear keen to gain MES. At the recent Strategic 
and Economic Dialogue between China and the US in July, the US promised to 
“consult through the JCCT” (Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade).  
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IV. Major regulatory and transparency issues 
Introduction 
China’s World Trade Organisation accession protocols, as noted in the previous 
section, were a landmark for the country’s trade relations with other nations, but they 
also provided a significant boost to the liberalisation of China’s investment 
environment. Tariffs on inputs were substantially reduced; local-content requirements 
and mandates to export a proportion of production were—for the most part—
withdrawn; many new industries were completely opened up to foreign businesses, 
and in others, the caps on their holdings in joint ventures were raised. Despite this, the 
regulatory system governing investments remains generally weak, plagued by 
inconsistent application of standards and laws, numerous grey areas within existing 
legislation and a lack of transparency within the system. Many foreign investors 
perceive a widespread and growing degree of discrimination on the part of official 
agencies that favours domestic businesses17. 
Advocates of a Sino-US BIT argue that it would provide new avenues and new 
authority for companies to address these issues18, and they hope that it could transform 
the local investment environment. Clearly, a high quality BIT would bring many 
advantages. Not least, these could potentially include extra protection against 
expropriation, the liberalisation of restrictions on corporate transfers of funds, the 
removal of content and technology-transfer requirements on investments, and access 
to international arbitration in cases of disputes between businesses and the sovereign. 
Nevertheless, as significant disputes remain over China’s implementation of its WTO 
accession promises, so too a BIT would be unlikely to remove all current sources of 
disagreement. BITs do not tend to cover all fields in detail, and the burden of proving 
breaches of treaty commitments can be difficult. Fundamental clashes will also remain 
between the push from businesses to liberalise the investment environment and the 
policy agendas of the two governments. On the Chinese side, there exists a 
determination to build companies able to compete at the global level and a desire, on 
the part of the government, to retain control over the “commanding heights” of the 
economy, not least to aid macroeconomic policy management. These ambitions favour 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) especially. Moreover, both the US and China share a 
desire to protect strategically important sectors, such as defence, from investments that 
might undermine their sovereign authority. 
Regarding the US, many in China feel that this position has been taken too far, with 
the review process of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(CFIUS) serving as a block to investments—for example, Huawei’s attempted buy an 
interest in 3Com—that are politically rather than strategically sensitive. Although 
                                                          
17 For example, the 2009/10 European Chamber of Commerce in China Position Paper notes that “European 
companies believe that their Chinese competitors are benefiting from infrequent audits or—in many cases—not 
being audited at all. This discretionary application of environmental regulations amounts to a hidden subsidy for 
non-compliant Chinese companies”.  
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some US parties share this view, a large constituency in the US also feels that the 
CFIUS review system is an essential tool for safeguarding national security, so 
adjustments to the system would be controversial. 
Although a BIT cannot resolve all the regulatory complications facing businesses 
investing in the two nations, it may still be able to make a positive contribution in 
many areas. The extent of any improvement in the business environment created by a 
BIT will obviously depend on the type of agreement signed. The traditional BIT forms 
adopted by the Chinese and US governments differ significantly, making it 
particularly hard to judge the possible benefits that may be gained. The analysis below 
looks at some of the main regulatory and transparency issues that a Sino-US BIT 
might address, and it attempts to flesh out some of the possible implications that a 
treaty could have if agreement in these areas might be reached. 
 
Key findings 
Protection from expropriation is one of the most standard elements of any BIT. 
Standard US and Chinese BITs include clauses that provide for swift, transferable and 
fair-market-value compensation for investments that are expropriated, and both 
require that the process is to be done in accordance with the law. 
Nevertheless, this clause would not be without controversy. The biggest disagreement 
would probably emerge over the concept of indirect expropriation—that is, where an 
action has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation, even without the transfer of title 
or outright seizure. In standard US BITs, this is explicitly addressed (for example in 
Annex B of the Rwanda-US BIT); in Chinese ones, it is not addressed—although 
exceptions such as the China-India BIT of 2006 do address indirect expropriation, in 
terms that seem to have borrowed from the US model BIT19. 
In China’s case, indirect expropriation is a particular concern, owing to a number of 
situations that are already on the horizon. US companies are concerned over a 
provision in China’s anti-monopoly law (AML), which came into force in 2008, that 
allows for compulsory licensing of intellectual property (IP) if abuse of monopoly 
authority occurs. The American Chamber of Commerce in China has noted: 
“The AML does not, however, clarify the distinction between legitimate exercises of 
IP rights and abuses. US companies are particularly concerned that unsound 
approaches to market definition may lead to findings that IP holders are “dominant” in 
markets for their own technology and that their unilateral refusal to license their IP to 
competitors or charging of royalties commensurate with the commercial value of their 
IP may be condemned as abusive”20. 
As China’s policy makers seek to address the challenges facing them, the temptation 
to resort to compulsory licensing might well be strong. Would a technology company 
like Qualcomm be forced to provide access to its technology, for example, to help 
China move up the value chain? Less commercially aggressive examples are also 
                                                          
19 Cai Congyuan, China-US BIT negotiations and the future of investment treaty regime: a grand bilateral bargain 
with multilateral implications, p.22 
20 American Business in China 2009 white paper p.39 
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conceivable. The compulsory licensing of medical intellectual property (IP) to address 
a medical crisis has already been seen in many emerging countries like Thailand and 
Brazil as they dealt with AIDS: if China faced an emergency viral outbreak, it too 
could feel obliged to resort to compulsory licensing. In addition, there has been some 
speculation that environmental technology could come under compulsory licensing as 
part of an effort to address China’s emissions. For these reasons, US businesses would 
view provisions to protect against indirect expropriation as an important part of any 
high-quality BIT. 
Direct expropriation of intellectual property is, of course, also a concern for US 
companies in China. In AmCham-China’s 2009 Business Climate Survey, 72% of 
respondents viewed enforcement of IP rights as ineffective, despite some recent 
incremental improvements. Some 12% found it “totally ineffective”21. In so much as 
appropriation is carried out by the government, or by government-linked entities and 
individuals, cases could be brought under a BIT seeking remedy for appropriation of 
IP. To take hypothetical examples, if a Chinese state-owned enterprise was producing 
pirated Microsoft software or manufacturing cars using IP stolen from GM, a case 
could theoretically be brought for redress under a BIT. In practise, however, such 
behaviour is already illegal. Poor enforcement and weak punishments for violators of 
the law are among a number of lingering obstacles preventing an improvement in IP 
protection. Although a BIT might strengthen the IP environment by allowing investors 
to bypass the local legal system and go to international arbitration, its effectiveness 
would be partly determined by the conditions stipulated in the treaty. If the document 
required that investors first attempt to seek redress via the local regulatory system, its 
effect in this field might be muted. 
China is a relative newcomer to the concept of national treatment (that no 
discrimination should exist between the treatment of investments by domestic and 
foreign parties)22. Although there were some exceptions (notably with developed-
nation treaties) through the 1980s and 1990s, most of China’s BITs merely adhered to 
the most-favoured-nation (MFN) principles—that is, investments by companies from 
the BIT signatories would receive treatment no less favourable than that accorded to 
any third party. 
Even since 1998 when this practice seems to have changed, China has often inserted 
clauses that weaken the strength of the national-treatment provision. For example, the 
China-Botswana BIT of 2000 precedes the commitment to national treatment with the 
phrase “without prejudice to its laws and regulations”, which “limits the effectiveness 
of the national-treatment provision to a best-effort clause”23 (see endnotes for source). 
Although there is often some contrast between the treatment China offers to 
developing countries and that available to OECD governments, in the latter case too 
China still tends to hedge its bets on national treatment. Its 2005 BIT with the Czech 
Republic, for example, contains an exemption (seen in a similar form in many other 
recent BITs) for any existing regulation that does not conform to national treatment, as 
well as the continuation and even the possible amendment of non-conforming 
                                                          
21 American Business in China 2009 white paper p.39 
22 Axel Berger, China’s new bilateral investment treaty programme: Substance,  rationale and implications for 
international investment law making, p.9  
23 Ibid, p.12 
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legislation. China makes a commitment to “take all appropriate steps in order to 
progressively remove the non-conforming measures”24, but in practice many observers 
feel that there has been little effort to adhere to this legal platitude. 
Although national-treatment and MFN clauses have not proved so far to be a means 
for removing existing discriminatory treatment, it is possible that they could serve as a 
useful tool for preventing the imposition of further discriminatory treatment. As 
foreign companies in China become more concerned about the risk of unequal 
treatment, and as new industries potentially emerge in future, this could become an 
important argument in favour of a BIT with China. In addition, under the MFN clause, 
countries that have secured a BIT can be reasonably confident that they will enjoy any 
benefits that subsequent negotiations deliver to other investor nations if China makes 
further concessions in future. 
The fact that a BIT gives an investor a legal-party status and the ability to take a 
foreign government to international arbitration is among the treaty’s most fundamental 
benefits. US companies have won awards in a number of cases challenged under 
BITs—for example, Duke Energy’s successful claim against Ecuador in 2008 25 . 
Particularly for a country like China, which is very cautious about giving up any 
aspect of its sovereignty, granting the right for a company to take it to an international 
court is no small step. Indeed, following growing concern among Chinese officials 
about the vagueness of fair-and-equal-treatment conditions, some recent bilateral 
economic treaties have begun trying to provide more clarity. On the positive side, 
some of these efforts are drawing it closer to US practice: in the China-Mexico BIT of 
2008, Article 5 on minimum standards of treatment draws from the US 2004 BIT 
Model on fair and equal treatment26. 
For US firms in China, the right to fair and equal treatment with Chinese investors 
will be among the most important aspects of this legal protection. It is true that 
Chinese courts have sometimes ruled against local authorities in legal cases. 
Nevertheless, such examples are few and far between, and given that the legal system 
is explicitly subservient to the Chinese Communist Party, it would be hard to envisage 
the courts ruling against the central government in a high-profile case. China is of 
course not the only country where foreign businesses would feel more comfortable 
taking their cases to an unbiased international tribunal. Fair-and-equal-treatment 
clauses are among the most relied upon clauses in claims by investors under BITs—
and also among the most successful27. 
One particular field of equal treatment worth highlighting relates to denigrating 
publicity campaigns. In 2008 the Biwater v Tanzania case saw a tribunal rule that a 
series of public announcements denigrating the investor’s poor performance and 
announcing that a new public entity would be taking over the service were in violation 
                                                          
24 Article 3, Agreement between the Czech Republic and the People’s Republic of China on the promotion and 
protection of investments 
25 UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA Monitor No.1, International Investment 
Agreements, p.7 
26 Cai Congyuan, China-US BIT negotiations and the future of investment treaty regime: a grand bilateral bargain 
with multilateral implications, p.13 
27 UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA Monitor No.1, International Investment 
Agreements, p.8 
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of the fair-and-equal-treatment standard—even given the investor’s poor record, due 
process was found to be due28. Given state-control over the media, and the country’s 
tendency to launch campaigns against foreign companies in the press before they 
reach the courts (for example, the recent anti-bribery case concerning Rio Tinto), a 
BIT might provide useful support. Nevertheless, other tribunal judgments have 
stressed that their decisions must take into account the circumstances prevailing in the 
host state, which investors would have taken into consideration when making their 
investment. 
Role of BIT in challenging policies favouring SOEs  
Within China, there are a number of government policies designed to favour domestic 
companies, especially state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which do appear to clash with 
the principle of equal treatment for investments. Industrial-development policies can 
provide preferential access to land and financing29, lower duties on imported inputs, 
and subsidies for research and development30 to which foreign-invested firms in China 
might not have access. Indeed, particularly with regard to financing, SOEs in China 
are thought to enjoy better access even than their counterparts in the domestic private 
sector. The proliferation of active policy support for sectors like automotives and 
electronics in the wake of the economic slowdown of 2008-09 raises the concern that 
support issued under such measures may in practice be restricted, or 
disproportionately allocated, to domestic enterprises 31 . Policies like the “home 
appliances to the countryside” programme (subsidising appliances for sale in rural 
areas), which are based on approved supplier lists, are particularly vulnerable to 
unequal treatment—though several foreign manufacturers appear on the lists of 
approved products under this particular policy. 
The effect of a BIT on policies designed to favour “national champions” and SOEs 
will of course depend on the phrasing of the treaty. Some governments have 
specifically included clauses to protect their ability to maintain policies that favour 
domestic enterprises. Morocco’s investment treaty with the UK, for example, includes 
a provision exempting it from providing national treatment in the case of benefits 
resulting from “government aids reserved for its own nationals in the context of 
national development programmes and activities”. These sorts of exemptions are not 
typically included in BITs that China has signed to date, so optimists might hope that a 
potential BIT’s clauses on national treatment and fair and equal treatment could prove 
a useful tool in curbing policies that favour SOEs. 
However, it is questionable whether a BIT would be able to provide investors with an 
important tool to fight this discrimination in favour of SOEs and domestic firms. First, 
the jump between there being a widespread perception of unequal treatment and 
proving it would be difficult to make (see Transparency and uniformity of regulations 
below). Second, China has a marked tendency towards aggressive responses when 
challenged. Countries that impose sanctions on Chinese goods may find themselves 
                                                          
28 UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA Monitor No.1, International Investment 
Agreements, p.6 
29 Economist Intelligence Unit, China Country Finance 2009, p.101-102 
30 American Business in China 2009 white paper p.96-98 
31 For additional details on examples of industrial policies under this plan see Economist Intelligence Unit, China’s 
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facing disproportionately large sanctions in retaliation 32 . Similarly, companies 
operating within China fear that if they took on the government in a major court case, 
their business within China would be irretrievably damaged—even if they won. 
An extreme example of the Chinese authorities’ strong response to companies that are 
perceived to challenge its interests was provided in 2009, when several executives 
from Rio Tinto, an international mining giant, were arrested. The incident followed 
Rio Tinto’s rejection of a bid by Chinalco, China’s state-owned aluminium giant, to 
raise its stake in Rio Tinto, as well as Rio Tinto’s refusal to accept a reduction in iron-
ore contract prices during negotiations with China in 2008-09. Although charges of 
espionage against the Rio Tinto executives were eventually dropped to bribery, the 
case clearly attracted political interest at the highest levels. 
It is thus quite likely that only a company willing to write off its commercial future (at 
least in the short- to medium-term) in China would be willing to take advantage of the 
potential for international arbitration. And given the growing importance of the 
Chinese market, there are few foreign investors who would fall into this category. 
Against this background, it is not really a surprise that despite the fact that China has 
signed the second-largest number of BITs after Germany, it has yet to have a single 
investment-treaty claim filed against it (as at end-2008) 33 . By contrast, the US 
government is frequently taken to court (even by its own citizens!), and foreign 
companies feel little compunction in taking it to court under investment-treaty 
commitments—12 cases had been filed against it as at end-200834. 
The Chinese government would probably resist strongly any efforts to use a BIT as a 
tool to undermine its ability to favour SOEs and build up national champions. This is 
partly because it is keen to protect and promote Chinese SOEs for reasons of national 
pride (see Market access for more discussion). But another important reason for this 
stance is the government’s belief that its influence over these “commanding heights” 
of the economy is one of its most important tools for managing the economy. It is 
possible that this situation will change as the country develops and other 
macroeconomic policy tools—like interest rates—become more effective, but this will 
probably take many years. 
Most bilateral investment treaties allow investors to take disputes with the host state to 
binding international arbitration under the UN Commission on International Trade 
Law (Uncitral) Arbitration Rules or the International Centre for Settlement of Investor 
Disputes (ICSID), although other options exist. The process of arbitration frameworks 
bypassing national courts is naturally somewhat controversial. Although this allows an 
level playing field that grants protection to investors in both of the signatory states to a 
BIT, it simultaneously impinges on the sovereignty of those same states to make 
subsequent changes to their regulatory environments—or at least increases the cost of 
making such changes, owing to the need to compensate affected investors. This can 
reduce states’ flexibility to pass laws in response to specific circumstances. Singapore, 
for example, wished to include provisions in its BIT with the US allowing it to limit 
                                                          
32 In 2000, for example, China responded to a rise in South Korean tariffs on imports of Chinese garlic by banning 
imports of South Korean mobile phones and polyethylene. 
33 UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA Monitor No.1, International Investment 
Agreements, p.13 
34 Ibid, p.13 
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short-term investments in emergency circumstances (see p. 40). Some feel that 
arbitration decisions made under BITs have interpreted the contents of the treaties 
beyond their original intentions. This could be a growing concern, since BITs are often 
short and vague relative to other international treaties, allowing leeway for broad 
interpretation. Others worry that BITs that apply to post-establishment protection of 
investments may result in governments becoming more cautious about screening the 
types of investment that they let in. 
China’s BITs appear to prefer arbitration through the ICSID mechanism. Most 
investors regard ICSID favourably, thanks to its links with the World Bank—a 
connection suggesting that failure to comply with an arbitration ruling would result in 
the unfavourable attention of the World Bank, which might affect its decisions on 
financing. Allen & Overy35 note that states that sign up to ICSID resolution (including 
the US and China) “are not able to challenge awards in their courts and must enforce 
the pecuniary obligations of awards as if they were a final judgment of their own 
highest court”. However, the ICSID Convention does not override domestic laws 
relating to sovereign immunity from execution of awards, and arbitration decisions 
can be revised or annulled on review. Full proceedings under ICSID often run for two 
to three years. 
There is no known example of a case being brought by an investor against China 
under a BIT. An important reason for this is likely to be the fear that doing so would 
imperil an investor’s future business prospects in China, although other considerations 
may be a lack of awareness of the possibility, law firms’ reluctance to promote this 
option and concerns about the reliability of the process. To date, foreign investors 
seem to have shown a preference for pushing their governments to protect their 
investments by encouraging China to enforce fully the terms of its WTO accession 
commitments. Lobbying by US entertainment companies, for example, was a factor 
behind the US move to bring a case against China under the WTO over the 
deficiencies in its intellectual-property-rights legal system (a decision, largely against 
China, was reached in January 2009). Chinese investors, by contrast, have been known 
to pursue claims under China’s BITs. For example, under the terms of the China-Peru 
BIT, Tsa Yap Shum launched a claim that actions undertaken by Peru’s tax authority in 
2004 undermined his business. 
In line with its WTO accession protocols, particularly under the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), China has already revised many laws relating 
to performance requirements associated with investment, including those that affect 
export performance, local-content requirements and technology transfers. By and 
large, foreign investments are no longer required to adhere to local-content or export-
performance requirements before being approved. Nevertheless, this sometimes may 
unofficially be a factor in officials granting approval36. This is partly because foreign 
investors are free to sign up informally to such commitments. (It is possible that 
contracts with such “voluntary” clauses could be challenged under WTO auspices, but 
as noted above few foreign companies are willing to face the repercussions of bringing 
legal cases against the authorities in China.) The range of performance requirements 
banned under US BITs can be wider than that secured under the TRIMs agreement, 
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but in practice problems in China today seem related more to the poor implementation 
of existing protection. 
An increasing number of foreign investors in China are aware of growing pressure to 
transfer technology to their China-based vehicles. Given the high degree of discretion 
Chinese officials enjoy in approving foreign investments, many businesses feel that 
encouragement of such transfers in practice often amounts to requirement. The 2009 
American Chamber of Commerce’s white paper notes that “China has long made 
technology transfer a requirement of approvals for investments and sales in support of 
large-scale projects, particularly for those that are publicly funded” 37. Its point is re-
emphasised by the European Chamber of Commerce’s position paper, which adds that 
the authorities can sometimes require companies to provide highly confidential 
information for product or plant approval. Indeed, the experts who look at this 
information to evaluate the approval sometimes also work for, or have links with, 
competitors of the foreign companies concerned, leading to leakage of technology38. 
In some sectors, foreign investors are required to have proprietary technology. In 
sectors like steel where this condition is complemented by caps that limit foreign 
companies to minority stakes, this arguably would result in an effective requirement 
for the transfer of technology39. 
A BIT that clearly ruled out making investments conditional upon technology transfers 
might give individual companies an extra avenue for pursuing claims against the 
Chinese government when these became an issue (although as mentioned earlier, 
whether they would wish to challenge the government like this is another matter). 
However, a BIT would be unlikely to influence policies that promote technology in 
investments without discrimination between foreign and local companies—such as the 
granting of tax incentives to companies whose investments held desirable or high-
technology intellectual property. Given the existing protection that the TRIMs 
agreement should offer, the problem lies at least in part in the flexibility that local 
officials have—unofficially—in approving or denying investments. Proving under a 
BIT that such behaviour was discriminatory would be tough (see Transparency and 
uniformity of regulations below). 
In theory, there is not a big gap between the standard US and Chinese BITs regarding 
payments on transfers related to investments and returns, despite the complication of 
China’s capital-account restrictions. China already allows businesses to repatriate 
profits and make other legitimate business-related payments. Nevertheless, foreign 
investors in China have raised concerns over the Chinese government’s monitoring of 
capital flows. Transfer-pricing arrangements and royalty payments can come under 
particular scrutiny, causing delays and regulatory hassle for businesses. Questions on 
royalty payments in particular may sometimes be designed to encourage companies to 
transfer technology into China-invested enterprises. It remains questionable whether 
standard BITs would be able to offer much additional support for free transfers of 
funds by foreign-invested companies. 
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Meanwhile, China has some concern about the additional limitation that a BIT might 
impose on that country’s ability to impose restrictions on financial transfers during 
times of economic crisis. The government is keen to maintain an ability to prevent 
both potentially destabilising inflows of speculative capital and sudden outflows of 
funds. The memory of the impact that volatile financial flows had during the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-98 looms large, and such fears would probably have to be 
assuaged if a BIT were to be successfully concluded. The recently concluded China-
Mexico BIT, for example, includes an exemption permitting the temporary imposition 
of controls on currency convertibility if threats emerge to the balance of payments40. 
With regard to system-destabilising outflows, Article 20 of the US model BIT might 
potentially provide the basis for permitting special-case restrictions (especially if 
applied equally to Chinese and US institutions). However, the sensitivity of limiting 
transfer flows is highlighted by the fact that the US rebuffed Singapore’s efforts to 
include a special exemption in their bilateral FTA allowing Singapore to limit short-
term investment activities in exceptional circumstances41. 
China suffers from an immature and unsatisfactory regulatory regime, despite 
substantial improvements over the last few decades, which would pose problems for 
implementing a high-quality BIT. Foreign investors are concerned at the lack of 
consultation that often precedes new regulations, especially at the local level in many 
parts of China. The recent agreement under the Strategic Economic Dialogue (now 
Strategic and Economic Dialogue) to allow all draft regulations affecting business to 
be released for a one-month commentary period is welcome in this regard, but it 
appears it is only being implemented with patchy effectiveness42. 
When it comes, legislation is often vague and the implementation of regulations 
within China is usually a matter for local authorities, leading to a high degree of 
discretion in enforcement and thus widely varying practices in terms of 
implementation across different regions. Clarifying regulations sometimes come out 
long after the laws to which they apply, and the laws themselves are often changed 
with unnerving frequency. The lack of reliable and consistent enforcement of laws is 
of particular relevance to the aspects of a BIT dealing with national-treatment and 
most-favoured-nation status. Discrimination favouring local companies would be 
especially hard to prevent if courts do not enforce regulations strictly and consistently. 
(Courts in China are subordinate to regional governments, whose local officials may 
have commercial or other interests in Chinese companies within their jurisdictions.) 
Theoretically, regional governments do fall under the coverage of a BIT. A state is 
generally held to be liable for the actions of lesser entities such as “provincial or 
regional authorities, the security services and police, courts of law and other judicial 
or quasi-judicial institutions, private companies working on behalf of the State, public-
sector utilities, corporations over which the State exercises de facto control and 
individuals working for or on behalf of the State”43. This is the case even if the state in 
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practise has little control over these entities. Past experience shows that investors have 
brought cases under investment treaties based on actions at the sub-national level. A 
Congressional Research Service report has noted that under NAFTA, “investor-state 
provisions gave rise to numerous ‘indirect expropriation’ claims against sub-national 
(state) governments in the United States, Mexico and Canada over environmental and 
other regulations”44. 
Nevertheless, if an investor wished to bring a case to international tribunal under a 
Sino-US BIT, proving discrimination might be difficult. The government’s position 
may, at face value, be consistent with non-discriminatory treatment, making it hard to 
prove a breach45. In addition, discriminatory policies may sometimes not be explicitly 
spelt out, either at the local or at the national level, but may still exist as an 
understanding. The lack of transparency about inner government policy and workings 
would be a further impediment to proving a case. It is unlikely the government would 
willingly surrender documentary evidence during an investigation into whether 
discriminatory treatment was policy, especially if it was incriminatory. Indeed, many 
relevant documents would doubtless be considered state secrets. Contradictions 
between policies and statements issued by various public officials at different levels of 
authority (which occur frequently) would create further challenges in determining 
whether or not a policy was officially “sanctioned”. 
In principle, a BIT could improve the lack of transparency by including clauses to 
address this issue. Although these are not standard in Chinese BITs, they have 
appeared in ones signed by the United States. Nevertheless, the fact that China has 
repeatedly committed to improving transparency in past agreements and yet has still 
fallen short of successfully implementing these conditions suggests that hopes on this 
front should be contained. 
There is a perception among many foreign investors that China is tightening access to 
its markets as far as investments are concerned. This is particularly true for mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A). New regulations were issued in 2006 that allowed a further 
government-approval step for M&A deals that affect “national economic security” or 
that involve famous Chinese brands46. The implementation of the anti-monopoly law 
(AML) in 2008 further toughened the situation. The vague definitions in these 
regulations give broad scope for rejecting deals. Many observers think that these 
measures may sometimes be used to shield monopolistic or incumbent Chinese 
enterprises against competition from foreign-invested enterprises. Many observers 
also viewed the rejection of Coca Cola’s bid for Huiyuan, a Chinese juice producer, in 
2009 over monopoly concerns as highlighting the government’s wish to preserve 
“national champions”. According to this argument, Huiyuan was simply too big for 
officials to allow it to be taken over by a foreign company47. 
Meanwhile, the government continues to adjust the foreign investment catalogue in 
accordance with its policy goal of encouraging foreign investment in sectors that help 
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China’s move up the economic value chain and away from polluting or low-value-
added industries. In the long run, this may close off more sectors to foreign 
investment. 
Against this background, some advocates of a BIT view it as a “new WTO” 
agreement—that is, a way of encouraging China to open its market and allow foreign 
direct investment (FDI) into new sectors. Traditional US BITs include a pre-
establishment protection element, which in China’s case would prevent it from 
discriminating between Chinese and US investors in reviewing and authorising 
investments, granting business licences and other steps necessary to set up an 
investment. Clearly, the scope of businesses that local companies are permitted to 
undertake is much wider than that open to foreign companies, so this would mark a 
major reform. Among the sectors that could benefit are automotives, petrochemicals, 
information, telecommunications and technology (IT&T), and certain renewable 
energy industries; in all these sectors, foreign investment is restricted to joint ventures 
in which the level of foreign shares is capped. Financial services would also face less 
discriminatory treatment at the establishment phase (for example, discriminatory 
capital requirements now deter foreign banks from expanding branch networks). 
Although this would clearly be extremely beneficial if it could be achieved, the 
outlook for improving market access through a BIT is difficult at best. Traditionally, 
China’s BITs deal only with the post-establishment phase of an investment. 
Negotiators for other OECD nations that have recently signed bilateral economic 
treaties with China report that their opposite numbers have been extremely unwilling 
to countenance any liberalisation of restrictions on foreign investments48. Indeed, most 
Chinese officials suggest that there is still lingering resentment over the concessions 
offered under the WTO accession. In practical terms, the fact that state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) dominate many of the industries that remain closed or restricted 
would further impede liberalisation; moreover, the leaders of the SOEs have a 
powerful lobby in government, and often their political rank is equivalent to 
ministerial status. Potential critics of a BIT would probably argue that adjusting the 
present investment-approval regime to adapt it to the US model BIT would not only 
affect areas the Chinese government sees as important for security reasons but would 
also affect the government’s ability to control sectors that are important for economic 
planning—such as housing 49 . It would require a very senior advocate of further 
opening within the government, possibly a vice-premier or higher, to campaign 
actively in favour of change in order to press it forward. At present, it is hard to 
discern such a figure. 
If China were to be persuaded to back a pre-establishment clause in a BIT, it would 
probably have to be offered some form of concessions on the approval process for 
Chinese companies entering the US market. There is a perception within China that 
the US may use spurious (in Chinese eyes) claims about strategic threats to block 
Chinese investments, notably through the CFIUS review process. Strong political 
pressures to block attempted Chinese investments in US companies have certainly 
                                                          
48 Confidential interviews conducted by the Economist Intelligence Unit. 
49accessed at http://finance.jrj.com.cn/2008/12/0104392922830.shtml.  Tian 
Feng notes that measures to control economically important sectors do not necessarily need to discriminate 
between local and foreign companies, but notes that liberalisation of investment restrictions would likely be a “one-
way street”. 
Chinese interests
Briefing paper:  Evaluating a potential US-China BIT 41 
Country and Economic Research www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010 
 
been felt in high-profile cases, such as the bid by China National Offshore Oil Corp 
(CNOOC) for Unocal and Huawei’s attempt to purchase an interest in 3Com. 
Concessions on the CFIUS approval process might win Chinese flexibility for making 
greater concessions, especially as Chinese companies look to expand within the US. 
(The winding down of the US government’s stakes in major corporations in the 
financial and other sectors will probably prompt intense interest among Chinese 
companies keen to expand abroad.) However, the reality is that the Foreign Investment 
and National Security Act recently strengthened CFIUS processes; hence, it is unlikely 
that they would be up for negotiation. 
Chinese companies are in any case expanding their presence in the US and would 
probably see value in other aspects of a BIT, such as those requiring national-
treatment and most-favoured-nation status. One particular area that might interest 
them would be that allowing special consideration of investors engaged in activities 
associated with investments when it comes to visas and working permits; the difficulty 
in obtaining visas to visit and work in the US is a source of much irritation for 
Chinese businessmen. Nevertheless, the advantages these areas offer to Chinese firms 
would be unlikely to persuade China to move away from its traditional post-
establishment model of protection for investments. Moreover, some Chinese 
academics argue that “a BIT’s role in encouraging Chinese enterprises to ‘go out’ 
would be limited”, owing to the significant gap between Chinese firms’ technical and 
management capacities, relative to those in the US, which manifest as low rates of 
return on investments in the US 50 . Low returns are especially damaging for 
prospective Chinese investments in the US, as the expected trend of renminbi 
appreciation against the US dollar in the next few years will further reduce the 
prospective profit in renminbi terms. 
One more crucial point for the Chinese is the protection of the value of its investments 
in US securities. Acquisitions of US-issued debt represent the most important path at 
present for Chinese investment capital to enter the US51, and US-government debt is 
the most important element within those acquisitions. According to figures from the 
US Treasury, mainland Chinese investors were the largest holders of US Treasury 
securities in October 2009, with holdings worth US$798.9bn52. Although it is difficult 
to differentiate between private and public holders, it is likely that a very large chunk 
of this total reflects the country’s foreign-exchange reserves, which were valued at 
US$2.3trn at end-September 200953. Indeed, it is possible that China’s actual holdings 
of US debt may be even higher, if they are held indirectly via financial institutions in 
third-party countries. Preserving the value of China’s investments in these instruments 
has become an important policy prerogative for the Chinese government54. 
Theoretically, a BIT could also serve to boost inward US investment in China. A 
Chinese researcher, Tian Feng, has pointed out that US direct investment in China is 
relatively low, both as a proportion of total outbound US direct investment and as a 
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proportion of China’s received inward direct investment. Nevertheless, she cautions 
that the role of BITs in stimulating inward investment is far from clear and that 
additional uncertainty is raised by the question of the potential US “pre-establishment” 
BIT model, which is less researched than the more commonly used “post-
establishment” model. In addition, US investment in China has only recently picked 
up, despite the reforms associated with, for example, China’s 2001 entry into the 
WTO. Indeed, entry into the WTO saw much-more-important and wide-ranging 
reforms than BITs tend to bring about. As a result, it is not clear how much benefit a 
BIT would have in stimulating US investment in China55. 
As US Treasury officials have noted, the most significant impact of a BIT would be 
that it would “send a powerful signal that our two countries (the US and China) are 
committed to open investment and to treating each others’ investors in an open and 
transparent manner” 56 . Indeed, economic officials from other nations that have 
negotiated BITs have also highlighted the reassurance they can provide—for example, 
against the risk of expropriation—as one of their strongest advantages for businesses. 
Depending on the quality and details of the Sino-US BIT, it could also have a much 
more tangible and valuable effect. Advocates of an agreement look to the model of 
China’s WTO entry, which was a catalyst for the country’s legal development, vastly 
improving the regulatory environment for foreign businesses. If the more optimistic 
hopes were realised regarding a BIT’s potential market-access concessions, this would 
open up opportunities for US businesses that could be worth several billion US dollars 
or more, depending on the extent of the concessions. But even if a BIT served merely 
to push China to make its regulatory environment more transparent, and to implement 
its laws more effectively and in a fair and equal manner, foreign companies would 
welcome it. By contrast, although improvements in the regulatory environment will 
not depend on cases being brought under a BIT, it is likely that the continued failure of 
companies (or governments) to bring cases against China under a future BIT or 
existing economic treaties would diminish the impact of any deal agreed. 
Some would argue that the mere process of highlighting problems through negotiating 
a BIT will have an effect in forcing the Chinese authorities to focus attention upon the 
flaws within their regulatory regime for business. For the BIT to have a positive effect, 
China does not need to travel the full distance towards global best standards. 
Realistically, this may still be beyond its capacity, given its developing-country status 
and political system. But continued progress in this direction would be a beneficial 
result in and of itself, especially given present fears that China’s leaders may be 
backsliding away from commitments to economic openness. 
Meanwhile, on the Chinese side, the BIT negotiations allow a way for the Chinese 
government to engage in discussions over the challenges their countries’ enterprises 
face investing in the US. Given the potential impact that Chinese investments could 
have in terms of job creation and the development of a more balanced economic 
relationship between the two countries, this would be a welcome development. 
Nevertheless, given that Chinese companies in the US already enjoy relatively strong 
regulatory protection (notably in terms of fair and equal treatment), the effect of a 
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successfully concluded BIT for them would probably be less significant than for US 
companies in China. 
A final impact worth noting is the broader international significance that a US-China 
BIT would have. As a major treaty between the world’s largest economy and the third-
largest one, it would probably serve as a model for future BITs, particularly when both 
countries negotiate bilateral deals with other economic partners. Meanwhile, since 
many countries have BITs with China and the US that contain most-favoured-nation 
clauses, the benefits of a Sino-US BIT could percolate down to companies from these 
other locations. As this increases competition, such regulatory changes should boost 
productivity and encourage job-creating investment within both China and the US. 
 
Conclusion 
A Sino-US BIT would provide significant legal support for US companies in a number 
of fields. It would strengthen their claims to non-discriminatory treatment and bolster 
their right to produce without performance requirements or restrictions on their ability 
to transfer funds into and out of their investments. At a time when China appears to be 
retreating in some aspects of its welcoming attitude towards foreign direct investment 
(FDI), the extra security a BIT could offer to investors would be welcome. 
Nevertheless, for an investor to prove a case in international arbitration against China 
under the terms of the BIT would be difficult, given the existing complexities and grey 
areas within the Chinese legal and political system. Another problem would be the fact 
that any foreign investor challenging the Chinese government would also expect to 
face retribution that might shut them out of the rapidly growing local market. (This 
may also be a factor explaining why no cases have yet been brought against China 
under a BIT, despite the many such treaties that it has signed.) 
If China could be persuaded to adopt a pre-establishment BIT model as part of 
negotiations with the United States, this would represent a major breakthrough, and 
would offer US companies substantially greater access to the Chinese market in terms 
of investment opportunities. However, the US would face difficulty in offering 
reciprocal moves to liberalise access to its own market in terms of investment, 
especially given the recent strengthening of the CFIUS review process. As a result, it 
is hard to envisage the Chinese moving towards a pre-establishment model. 
 
 
V. Implications for the US economy 
Overview 
Successful conclusion of a BIT between the US and China—in addition to being an 
economic achievement—would represent an important political accomplishment, 
particularly in light of the rifts created by two failed high-profile attempts in the past 
several years by China to invest in the US. Severe opposition by US lawmakers, on 
national-security grounds, caused the failures of an US$18.5bn bid by China National 
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Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC) to buy Unocal in 2005 and a US$2.2bn offer by Huawei 
Technologies, in partnership with Bain Capital Partners (a US-based private-equity 
firm) to acquire 3Com. Indeed, the issue of the fairness of US authorities’ regulatory 
oversight of potential Chinese investments is an area of great concern for China in the 
BIT negotiations. 
The value of inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) from the US to China has 
ebbed and flowed over the past decade, but generally declined since reaching a peak 
of US$5.4bn in 2002. Likewise, the number of US investments in China has declined 
every year since 2003. A small uptick in 2008—to US$2.9bn, from US$2.6bn in 
2007—is likely to be followed by a steep decline in 2009, as a result of the global 
economic crisis that took hold in late 2008. 
 
Source: Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), China. 
Note: Dollar figures on left scale represent non-financial, utilised FDI. 
The value of China’s inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) to the United States 
has also fluctuated in recent years. In general, though, the scale of FDI flows from 
China to the US is significantly smaller than flows from the US to China (likewise, 
aggregate FDI inflows from the world to the US reached US$316bn in 2008, whereas 
inflows to China were US$108bn). The high in recent years of US$368m China-to-US 
FDI, reached in 2008, is surely to be followed by a decade low in 2009. Indeed, the 
first half of 2009 saw a bilateral outflow of FDI of US$407m, as Chinese companies 
concentrated on domestic business in the face of economic downturn. 
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Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Note: Figures are not seasonally adjusted; negative figures indicate outflows of FDI. Data for 2009 is 
estimated. Data for FDI inflows from China for years prior to 2002 are not available. 
In contrast to FDI flows, trade flows between the US and China steadily increased in 
1999–2008, from both an export and import perspective. According to data from the 
International Monetary Fund, China edged out Canada in 2007 and 2008 as the 
country from which the US imports the most. Though data reported by the two 
countries (compare the graphs) shows some variation in data, the general pattern is 
that China exports much more to the US than it imports from it—and vice versa for 
US trade with China. And although both countries reported a pullback in trade flows 
during the first quarter of 2009 (with imports more affected than exports), recently 
released US import estimates for July 2009 show the fastest monthly increase since 
the Commerce Department began publishing the data in 1992. That increase is one 
indication that the US is emerging from recession. 
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Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics database. Data for 2009 are estimated. 
 
 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics database. Data for 2009 are estimated. 
Extent of reciprocal market access 
Under the model US BIT text, the partner county receives “treatment no less 
favourable” than domestic investors from establishment through to sale or disposition 
of the investment. By several accounts, though, China is unlikely to sign the model 
agreement, thus leaving open the door to negotiation in terms of how much the treaty 
would diverge from US BITs with other countries in terms of market access. Both the 
US and China are moving somewhat slowly and cautiously in proceedings, as this BIT 
will surely be the most difficult one either country has worked out. 
Specific market-access concerns from the US side include regulatory barriers and 
delays, lack of transparency, discriminatory treatment of US businesses at the 
provincial and local levels, local-content requirements and capital controls. By some 
accounts, the US will also pursue pre-establishment guarantees—that is, guarantees 
against discrimination before an investment is established. China is likely to fight for 
guarantees only after establishment. In addition, the issue of the treatment of China’s 
state-owned enterprises by the Chinese government will probably continue to be on 
the negotiating table going forward. 
Economic sectors most likely to be affected 
It is difficult to predict which business sectors a US-China BIT would most affect, in 
large part because of the way the US model BIT approaches market access. Barring 
dramatic changes to the 2004 model text, the revision of which is now underway, it is 
likely that the new model text will afford investors in future US BIT partner countries 
similar national treatment as the current text—that is, treatment no less favourable 
than it accords investors from the US (as contained in Article 3 of the 2004 model 
BIT). That said, US BITs contain exceptions to national treatment for certain sensitive 
sectors. These are spelled out in an annex to each BIT in what is sometimes referred to 
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as a “negative list”, where the US and the partner country list, separately, which of 
their sectors are subject to exceptions from national treatment. Use of such exceptions 
may be a sticking point in the US-China BIT negotiations. 
When the US uses a negative list, the partner country is allowed to invest freely in all 
sectors of the US economy except the ones on the list, which may not be completely 
off limits to the partner country’s investors but are accorded something less than 
standard national treatment. China’s BITs, however, have traditionally addressed the 
issue of national treatment from a more vague perspective, simply stating that foreign 
investors are subject to domestic Chinese laws and leaving investors to navigate a 
sometimes tricky path in determining what those laws are. 
Negative lists enumerated by the US in BITs over the past decade have typically 
included air transport, banking, cable television, energy/power production, insurance, 
ownership of real property, radio/satellite communications and telephone/telegraph 
services. Though this list of sector exceptions is not standard across US BITs, it is 
difficult to imagine that any of those enumerated here would not be excluded in a BIT 
with China. 
Certain types of natural resources may also be included in the US’s negative list in a 
US-China BIT. Recent CFIUS reviews have not been supportive of such investments 
by China. As at mid-December 2009, for example, CFIUS is expected to recommend 
that President Obama reject the proposed purchase by a Chinese company of a 51% 
stake in Firstgold, a gold-mining company with properties in Nevada. The publicly-
stated rationale for the expected decision centres on the fact that Firstgold’s properties 
lie some 50 miles from a naval air station and that the transaction might result in 
sensitive military technology being passed on to foreign governments. Opponents of 
the recommendation counter that China’s growing ownership of the world’s supply of 
precious metals is a factor in the decision.57 
Despite the probable limitations on some sectors, a fairly broad swath of the US 
business community voiced its support for the US-China BIT directly to President 
Bush at the start of treaty negotiations in 2008. The industry associations supporting 
the BIT include those representing apparel and footwear, electronics, equipment 
manufacturers, insurance, financial services, information technology, retail and 
textiles.58 
According to one person interviewed for this analysis, a US-China BIT may contain 
provisions that would improve prospects for Chinese investment in the United States 
at a state and local level. That same person expressed hope that a US-China BIT 
would lead to better investment conditions for his industry, insurance. 
 
Macroeconomic impacts 
                                                          
57 List of typical US negative-list elements taken from analysis of individual BITs, available at 
http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral_Investment_Treaties/index.asp. 
58 Information in this paragraph from a public letter to President Bush in July 2008; original text in 
accompanying PDF. 
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Although a US-China BIT would not create a completely transparent Chinese 
investment environment, it would serve as a solid improvement in terms of protection 
for US investors in China, particularly in terms of strengthening rule of law and 
market-directed reforms. These outcomes, along with likely increased inflows of US 
foreign direct investment (FDI) into China and greater assurances from the US side 
that future Chinese investments will be evaluated in a non-discriminatory manner, 
would be among the most important effects of a successful US-China BIT. 
 
VI. Interviews 
To complete this study, the Economist Intelligence Unit conducted interviews with the 
following officials and organisations: 
1. American Insurance Industry Association 
2. A former official of the George W. Bush Administration who represented the US 
in Strategic Economic Dialogue discussions 
3. Erin Ennis, US China Business Council (USCBC), Washington, DC 
4. American Chamber of Commerce in Beijing 
5. Robert Stumberg, Professor of Law and Director, Harrison Institute of Public 
Law, Georgetown University 
6. Thea Lee, Policy Director, AFL-CIO 
Summary transcripts of interviewees or organisations who agreed to have their 
remarks on record are presented in the following pages. 
 
1.  American Insurance Association representative 
What are the insurance industry’s major concerns vis-à-vis the US-China BIT 
negotiations?  
The most significant problem facing the US insurance industry in China is high 
regulatory barriers. At present, foreign companies represent less than 2% of the 
property-and-casualty insurance market in China, a percentage that would be 
significantly higher if they were not being held back by Chinese regulation. The 
principal concern is that companies may not expand geographically unless they 
complete extensive application procedures on a province-by-province basis. Insurance 
companies are also shut out of certain product lines, namely third-party automobile 
liability insurance. 
Commitments concerning the insurance industry that China made as part of its WTO 
accession in 2001—in particular its agreement to grant licences to more foreign 
companies—represented a new plateau in terms of its overall regulatory environment; 
in practice WTO accession has not done much to improve the business environment 
for insurance companies. The China Insurance Regulatory Commission continues to 
be a major hindrance to doing business. The insurance industry views the BIT as an 
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opportunity to push China to a higher plateau in terms of openness and less-restrictive 
regulation (that is, creating a better business environment for insurance companies). 
Is there enough demand for insurance in China to absorb a significantly larger 
US insurance presence?  
Without a doubt, yes. The rapid increase in car ownership, in particular, presents a 
prime opportunity for insurance companies. An expanded insurance market presence 
would also have a positive impact in terms of protecting people from natural disasters. 
During the Sichuan earthquake in 2008, for example, buildings that one US insurance 
company had advised on sustained only very minor damage, while structures around 
them crumbled. 
Insurance is on the “negative list” (meaning that investment in the sector is restricted) 
in the text of many US BITs.  
What is the likelihood that insurance will be on the negative list in the potential 
US-China BIT, and what does that mean for the US insurance industry in China? 
Though the interviewee did not want to predict whether insurance would be on a 
potential list of industries subject to limitations under the BIT, he believes it would be 
“amazing” if China agreed to the model BIT text.  
What would be the impact of an expanded US insurance-industry presence in 
China on other industries? 
From the perspective of the financial industry, at least, a rising tide would lift all 
boats—that is, growth of one subsector of the industry would benefit other subsectors. 
What larger impacts (macroeconomic or otherwise) would an active US-China 
BIT have?  
Regardless of the outcome of the US-China BIT negotiations, it is certain that serious 
negotiations on investment and trade are a good thing for both parties, as it encourages 
mutual openness to foreign investment (particularly on China’s part). A BIT “with 
teeth” would be an even greater achievement. Furthermore, the BIT negotiations will 
set the stage for future open discussion of trade and investment issues. 
 
 
2. A former official of the George W. Bush Administration who 
represented the US in Strategic Economic Dialogue discussions with China 
What are the issues of greatest concern for the US and China within the BIT 
negotiations? 
It is important to keep in mind that past attempts at US-China BIT negotiations 
foundered due to China’s refusal to agree to stipulations providing for expropriation 
protection, fair and equitable treatment, and the ability of an investor to initiate third-
party arbitration. In recent BITs, however—with Germany, Finland and other 
countries—China has agreed to provide such protections. 
The real issue in regard to the US-China negotiations with the US is whether China 
will want to grandfather non-conforming measures from the past or whether it will 
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move closer to the US approach to BITs, which, according to the interviewee, supports 
transparency and predictability for investors. 
What are the prospects for reciprocal market access within the framework of a 
US-China BIT (that is, use of a “negative list” by the US compared with a 
possible “positive list” by China)? 
Past BITs to which China has been party have simply stated that investment by the 
partner country is open to all sectors according to domestic laws, a situation that 
leaves foreign investors to figure out what those laws are. The US approach, however, 
has been to use a “negative list” (within an annex to a BIT) to identify which sectors 
are subject to restrictions by each party to the treaty. Though the interviewee did not 
know how the issue would play out in the context of the current negotiations, he did 
indicate that China’s vague approach would not be acceptable to the US. 
The issue of how the US financial-services industry would be affected by a US-
China BIT has been a topic of discussion during our work on this analysis. Could 
you speak to the potential impacts of a BIT on financial-services firms?  
The question of how financial services will be affected is wrapped up in the general 
issue of national treatment—that is, whether China will agree to offer investors 
establishment and post-establishment protection (as the US accords to partner 
countries in all of its BITs), or whether it will attempt to impose exceptions. China’s 
position on this issue remains to be seen. In either case, national treatment of 
investment will be cross cutting—it will apply to all investors, financial services or 
otherwise, unless the sector is specifically addressed in an annex [or, presumably, in 
some equivalent of an annex if the model US BIT text is not the base from which the 
US-China BIT is developed]. In terms of whether a US-China BIT would improve 
market access for financial-services companies based in the US, the interviewee’s 
reaction was only if China agrees to provide adequate establishment and post-
establishment protection. 
Do you think the BIT will contain specific provisions for the financial-services 
sector? 
Yes, but the BIT is all encompassing—that is, financial services should not be more or 
less affected than other sectors. The bottom line is that if China is willing to open a 
sector, it is willing to open a sector—and a BIT will not strongly affect that. 
Has the US-China BIT negotiation process changed since President Obama took 
office? 
Not as far as the interviewee knows—both sides are proceeding with due caution, as 
they were at the start of negotiations under the Bush administration. 
 
3. Erin Ennis with the US China Business Council (USCBC), Washington, 
DC  
What is the status of the US China BIT discussions?  
The Obama administration is currently conducting an overall review of the BIT 
programme, so things are a bit in flux at the moment (Interview conducted in August 
2009).  
Briefing paper:  Evaluating a potential US-China BIT 51 
Country and Economic Research www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010 
 
A high-standard BIT would provide added certainty for investors in the market place. 
If rights were denied, then they [US companies] would have legal recourse. 
Six key elements of a high-quality BIT would include:  
Non-discrimination requirement. National treatment and most-favoured-nation 
(MFN) status. 
International law protection. Fair treatment compared to local investors.  
Prompt compensation for either direct or indirect expropriation. Indirect might be 
related to clean energy—for example, if China were to expropriate clean technology to 
resolve a climate “emergency” in the same way that Thailand, for example, forced 
medical companies to hand over drugs. 
Capital flows allowed in and out freely.  
Removal of performance requirements. Examples would be the use of local vendors 
or the export of a certain proportion of product. 
Allowance of arbitration if investors wish to challenge the government.  
A BIT could help “establish a record as to how to attack laws or unofficial practices 
that are creating an unlevel playing field. It would provide new avenues and new 
authority for companies to address these issues.” 
The Chinese government has recently been adopting policies that are seen as 
more demanding of foreign investors, for example, by passing the anti-monopoly 
law and requiring more technology transfers for tax incentives. How would a BIT 
affect these? 
Tax status is obviously a big area for technology requirements, but this is not 
necessarily discriminating (for example, if both domestic and foreign companies are 
held to the same standards). [And a BIT would not necessarily affect this.] 
The anti-monopoly law has a provision for compulsory licensing. There is some 
concern that this may be used if prices are not low enough—for example, in a field 
like telecommunications where the Chinese government feels a foreign company is 
abusing its “monopoly” position. 
A “BIT’s value is that it doesn’t try to lay down every situation, but provides some 
broad principles.” 
How much extra protection would a BIT provide over the existing provisions 
within WTO-related protocols for issues like technology transfer, export/local-
sourcing requirements and transparency? 
The US model BIT prohibits the imposition of performance requirements—such as 
technology transfer, local-content or export requirements—as a condition for an 
investment. On transparency, the US model requires that laws, regulations, procedures 
and administrative rulings related to any matter covered by the BIT be “promptly 
published or otherwise made publicly available.” 
So the BIT would definitely provide additional protection for investors, yet 
enforcement is key. Under a BIT, investor-state dispute settlement is not the only 
recourse; government to government would still be an option. And as with any issue, 
companies would likely seek alternative means to resolve problems before bringing a 
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case under the BIT, but they would have the additional option of bringing a case to an 
independent arbitration panel. 
What will be the problem with enforcing equitable treatment for US companies in 
China? 
“There’s no doubt it’s going to be difficult to find it [proof of discriminatory 
treatment]” 
For example whether domestic software is being favoured over foreign software in 
purchases by SOEs. Officials can publicly deny they have a policy of discrimination, 
but still send a message that means that this happens in practice. 
What do the Chinese want out of the BIT? 
Chinese firms have a lot of investments in the US and a sense they’re being 
discriminated against, for example, in US reviews of foreign acquisitions of domestic 
companies with security ramifications, such as 3Com. 
The majority of CFIUS reviews go forward under the radar. It may not be very 
transparent, but they are relatively fair. 
The reality is that the CFIUS review process is not going to be put on the table for 
negotiation since it has only recently been reviewed and adjusted. 
There are many Chinese investments at the state and local level, such as greenfield 
investments in Texas and Georgia. These might benefit from the provisions of a BIT. 
What implications would a BIT have for SEC approval of investments? 
I think, in general, the SEC doesn’t need to approve Chinese investments, but the US 
does reserve the right to restrict investment in some aspects of financial services. 
There are certain sectors that require regulatory approval for foreign investment over 
specific levels —say, for instance, banking or broadcast licences. Those areas would 
be specifically spelled out in the annex to a BIT, since the US uses a negative-list 
approach. 
So, for instance, in the US-Jordan BIT, the US lists these sectors as the ones in which 
it reserves the right to restrict foreign investment: atomic energy; customhouse 
brokers; licences for broadcast, common carrier or aeronautical radio stations; 
COMSAT; subsidies or grants, including government-supported loans, guarantees and 
insurance; state and local measures exempt from Article 1102 of the North American 
Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA) pursuant to Article 1108 thereof; landing of 
submarine cables; fisheries; air and maritime transport, and related activities; banking, 
insurance, securities and other financial services; and minerals leases on government 
land. 
Would a BIT still be valuable if it diverged from the US-model BIT? 
If the ultimate BIT looked like the US model BIT, regulatory processes would be 
greatly simplified. 
Every Chinese BIT to date has used a positive list and not a negative list, but a 
negative list (advocated by the US) opens up the potential for new investment fields as 
they emerge, so it is more liberalising. A more open investment list would provide 
competition that would help Chinese companies become stronger. 
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4. Robert Stumberg, Professor of Law and Director, Harrison Institute of Public 
Law, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 
Are the US-China BIT negotiations materially different from US BIT 
negotiations with other countries? 
In general, no. But a potential BIT with China is more concerning than other BITs—
not because China is expected to act deviously, but because China is such a big 
economy.  
Could you discuss how the Harrison Institute is involved in the BIT negotiations?  
Clients of the institute are, for the most part, state and local governments that are 
supportive of international trade but are worried that US trade negotiations are not 
supporting them. They are on the “defensive” side of investment-treaty negotiations. 
In practice, they are concerned that foreign investors will win BIT-related legal cases 
that would fail in US courts. 
Do you support the US-China BIT? 
Based on the 2004 model BIT, no. The legal risks for US-based companies are 
significant and should be thought through more thoroughly. A major mistake would be 
unintentionally giving China rights that domestic investors do not have, or freeing 
Chinese companies from obligations to which domestic companies are bound.  
In the financial-services sector, for example, how would a Chinese sovereign wealth 
fund be regulated in the US in terms of minimum-equity requirements? In addition, it 
is possible that a Chinese SWF that invests in the US under the auspices of a US-
China BIT could avoid future domestic regulatory changes in the financial sector, as it 
could argue under pre-existing law (that is, the BIT regulations) that it is not subject to 
new laws. 
Risks to the US in terms of third-party involvement are also significant. For example, 
under the current US model BIT, a country that sets up a subsidiary in China would be 
given the same rights as a Chinese company when investing in the US. If that third 
country is one with which the US has shaky investment relations, this presents a 
troublesome scenario. 
What are the prospects for reciprocal market access within the framework of a 
US-China BIT (that is, use of a “negative list” by the US compared with a 
possible “positive list” by China)? 
A positive list is much easier to control than a negative list; for that reason, the 
interviewee prefers a positive list to negative one. 
What alterations to the model BIT would you advocate? 
Several main points come to mind in terms of investor rights. First is the issue of 
access to investor-state arbitration and the idea that, in this regard, one size does not 
fit all. The US model BIT, unlike the BITs of most countries, enables partner countries 
to pursue international legal routes before exhausting domestic (that is, US) legal 
options. The US should consider whether it is appropriate to give the same arbitration 
rights to all countries with which it negotiates BITs, and whether the implications of 
those arbitration rights will be the same for all investors within a market. In the 
context of China, the sheer size of the market means that Chinese-owned companies 
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could acquire a significant stake in major US companies. Is it wise to provide investor 
arbitration to those companies? It is also possible that state-owned enterprises in 
China could behave very differently from other companies in regards to handling of 
investment disputes with the US. 
Second is the issue of BITs outsourcing constitutional law. The model BIT links 
minimum standard of treatment, which includes “fair and equitable treatment”, to the 
customary international law treatment of aliens. While this customary international 
law is in theory based on the general practice of states, in practice, an expanding and 
evolving approach to minimum standard of treatment has been taken in tribunals (one 
that is based on the decisions of other tribunals rather than the practice of states). In 
the long term, the asymmetry between foreign and domestic legal rights would put 
pressure on the US legal system to reform.  
Third is the issue of preserving US policy space. As the number of BITs increases, and 
thus more investors are given arbitration rights, the risk that arbitrators will interpret 
the ambiguity of investor protections in ways that are unfavourable to the United 
States increases. 
 
5. Thea Lee, Policy Director, AFL-CIO 
Do you support the US-China BIT? 
There are some concerns, some of which apply to all large developing economies 
(China, India and Russia have all initiated BIT negotiations with the US) and some of 
which are specific to China. In the case of China, the magnitude of the US trade 
deficit with China is a major concern. As it stands, many multinational companies 
have shifted portions of their operations to China; for US-based MNCs, this shift has 
had a detrimental impact on US jobs. It is possible that a US-China BIT will result in 
further negative impacts on US jobs (an even greater concern if worker rights are not 
better accounted for in the model BIT) and worsening of the trade deficit. 
I understand you were part of the subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on 
International Economic Policy that submitted a report on the model US BIT to 
the State Department and the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
several months ago. Would you summarise some of the main points you made in 
that report? 
There was a clear divide between environment supporters and labour supporters 
among the group that produced the report. Thea Lee’s main concern about that model 
BIT, apart from issues surrounding worker rights, is that the investor-state dispute-
settlement mechanism now in the model US BIT gives too much power to foreign 
investors. The mechanism provides extraordinary rights to foreign investors but does 
not require commensurate responsibilities. 
Could you speak to the labour issues surrounding a US-China BIT in particular? 
How do those issues differ from labour issues related to other US BIT 
negotiations?  
As a formidable industrial power, China is a case of its own. Beyond sheer economic 
size, it is clear that China is in violation of worker rights and freedom of association 
among workers. For example, aside from the Chinese Communist Party-backed All-
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China Federation of Trade Unions, unions are not allowed in China. And China does 
not enforce even existing legislation on minimum wage, health and safety, child labour 
and forced labour. These issues require serious attention if the US is to continue BIT 
negotiations with China. 
Do you have expectations for the macroeconomic impacts of a potential US-China 
BIT? Increased foreign direct investment, trade flows, etc.? 
While it is tough to estimate potential economic impacts, to the extent a BIT opens 
avenues for US multinational companies to relocate to or open branches or factories in 
China, there will be a clear negative impact on US jobs [given, presuming, lower 
operating and labour costs in China]. It is more difficult to assess the potential 
behaviour of Chinese firms if they were given greater capacity to invest in the US—
would they hire local workers and source inputs locally, for example? In either case, 
US-China BIT negotiators should be concerned about the potential for accelerating the 
already very large US trade deficit with China.  
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Appendix I: US BITs and date of entry into force 
 
(1) Grenada   March 3rd 1989 
(2) Cameroon   April 6th 1989 
(3) Bangladesh    July 25th 1989 
(4) Congo   July 28th 1989 
(5) Turkey   May 18th 1990 
(6) Senegal   October 25th 1990 
(7) Morocco   May 29th 1991 
(8) Panama   May 30th 1991 
(9) Egypt   June 27th 1992 
(10) Czech Republic  December 19th 1992 
(11) Slovakia   December 19th 1992 
(12) Tunisia   February 7th 1993 
(13) Sri Lanka   May 1st 1993 
(14) Kazakhstan   January 12th 1994 
(15) Kyrgyz Republic  January 12th 1994 
(16) Romania   January 15th 1994 
(17) Bulgaria   June 2nd 1994 
(18) Poland   August 6th 1994 
(19) Congo Brazzaville   August 13th 1994 
(20) Argentina   October 20th 1994 
(21) Moldova    November 25th 1994 
(22) Armenia    March 29th 1996 
(23) Ukraine    November 16th 1996 
(24) Latvia    November 26th 1996 
(25) Trinidad and Tobago  December 26th 1996 
(26) Mongolia    January 1st 1997 
(27) Estonia    February 16th 1997 
(28) Jamaica    March 7th 1997 
(29) Ecuador    May 11th 1997 
(30) Georgia    August 17th 1997 
(31) Albania    January 4th 1998 
(32) Bahrain    May 31st 2001 
(33) Bolivia    June 6th 2001 
(34) Croatia    June 20th 2001 
(35) Honduras    July 11th 2001 
(36) Azerbaijan    August 2nd 2001 
(37) Lithuania    November 11th 2001 
(38) Jordan    June 13th 2003 
(39) Mozambique   March 3rd 2005 
(40) Uruguay    November 1st 2006 
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Appendix II China BITs and date of entry 
into force 
(1) France May 30th 1984  
(2) Norway November 21st 1994  
(3) Singapore November 21st 1985  
(4) Thailand March 12th 1985  
(5) Kuwait November 23rd 1985  
(6) Austria September 12th 1985  
(7) Denmark April 29th 1985  
(8) Italy January 28th 1985  
(9) Sri Lanka March 13th 1986  
(10) Switzerland November 12th 1986  
(11) United Kingdom May 15th 1986  
(12) Japan August 27th 1988  
(13) New Zealand November 22nd 1988  
(14) Malaysia November 21st 1988  
(15) Poland June 7th 1988  
(16) Australia July 10th 1988  
(17) Ghana October 12th 1989  
(18) Bulgaria June 27th 1989  
(19) Pakistan February 12th 1989  
(20) Russia July 21st 1990  
(21) Turkey November 13th 1990  
(22) Mongolia August 25th 1991  
(23) Papua New Guinea April 12th 1991  
(24) Hungary May 25th 1991  
(25) Armenia July 4th 1992  
(26) Kazakhstan August 10th 1992  
(27) Kyrgyz Republic May 14th 1992  
(28) Moldova November 6th 1992  
(29) Turkmenistan November 21st 1992  
(30) Ukraine October 31st 1992  
(31) Uzbekistan March 13th 1992  
(32) South Korea September 30th 1992  
(33) Argentina November 5th 1992  
(34) Bolivia May 8th 1992  
(35) Philippines July 20th 1992  
(36) Vietnam December 2nd 1992  
(37) Greece June 25th 1992  
(38) Albania February 13th 1993  
(39) Belarus January 11th 1993  
(40) Croatia June 7th 1993  
(41) Georgia June 3rd 1993  
(42) Tajikistan March 9th 1993  
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(43) Uruguay December 2nd 1993  
(44) Laos January 31st 1993  
(45) United Arab Emirates July 1st 1993  
(46) Estonia September 2nd 1993  
(47) Lithuania November 8th 1993  
(48) Slovenia September 13th 1993  
(49) Egypt April 21st 1994  
(50) Azerbaijan March 8th 1994  
(51) Romania July 12th 1994  
(52) Chile March 23rd 1994  
(53) Ecuador March 21st 1994  
(54) Jamaica October 26th 1994  
(55) Peru June 9th 1994  
(56) Indonesia November 18th 1994  
(57) Iceland March 31st 1994  
(58) Morocco March 27th 1995  
(59) Serbia and Montenegro December 18th 1995  
(60) Cuba April 24th 1995  
(61) Israel April 10th 1995  
(62) Oman March 18th 1995  
(63) Algeria October 17th 1996  
(64) Mauritius May 4th 1996  
(65) Zambia June 21st 1996  
(66) Zimbabwe May 21st 1996  
(67) Bangladesh September 12th 1996  
(68) Cambodia July 19th 1996  
(69) Lebanon June 13th 1996  
(70) Saudi Arabia February 29th 1996  
(71) Syrian Arab Republic December 9th 1996  
(72) Cameroon May 10th 1997  
(73) Congo, December 18th 1997  
(74) Gabon May 9th 1997  
(75) South Africa December 30th 1997  
(76) Sudan May 30th 1997  
(77) Macedonia, June 9th 1997  
(78) Yemen February 16th 1998  
(79) Cape Verde April 21st 1998  
(80) Ethiopia May 11th 1998  
(81) Barbados July 20th 1998  
(82) Belize January 16th 1999  
(83) Bahrain June 17th 1999  
(84) Qatar April 9th 1999  
(85) Botswana June 12th 2000  
(86) Congo March 20th 2000  
(87) Brunei November 17th 2000  
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 (88) Iran July 22nd 2000  
(89) Kenya July 16th 2001  
(90) Mozambique July 10th 2001  
(91) Nigeria August 28th 2001  
(92) Sierra Leone May 16th 2001  
(93) Myanmar December 12th 2001  
(94) Jordan November 15th 2001  
(95) Cyprus January 17th 2001  
(96) Netherlands November 26th 2001  
(97) Côte d’Ivoire September 23rd 2002  
(98) Bosnia and Herzegovina June 26th 2002  
(99) Trinidad and Tobago July 22nd 2002  
(100) Djibouti August 18th 2003  
(101) Guyana March 27th 2003  
(102) Germany December 1st 2003  
(103) Benin February 18th 2004  
(104) Tunisia June 21st 2004  
(105) Uganda May 27th 2004  
(106) Finland November 15th 2004  
(107) Latvia April 15th 2004  
(108) Sweden September 27th 2004  
(109) Equatorial Guinea October 20th 2005  
(110) Guinea November 18th 2005  
(111) Madagascar November 21st 2005  
(112) North Korea March 22nd 2005  
(113) Belgium/Luxembourg June 6th 2005  
(114) Czech Republic December 8th 2005  
(115) Portugal December 9th 2005  
(116) Slovakia December 7th 2005  
(117) Spain November 14th 2005  
(118) Namibia November 17th 2005  
(119) Vanuatu April 7th 2006  
(120) India November 21st 2006  
